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Abstract: 
       Over the last decades since the fall of the Soviet Union, The Russian Federation has 
struggled to reclaim its grasp over Eastern Europe and re-establish itself as a major player 
on the international scene. Increased NATO expansion towards its borders, and the 
“Westernization” of Eastern Europe has led to the country feeling it has been boxed into 
a corner. The feeling that the Russian nation has been encroached upon by the Western 
world has led to the rise of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia, and the marked rise in 
nationalism within the country. In this Master’s Thesis, I intend to discuss the history of 
Russian nationalism prior to and during Vladimir Putin’s reign as President of the 
Russian Federation, and how this nationalism has been harnessed to achieve both his 
domestic and international political goals; These goals namely being the unification of 
the Russian people in support of the Kremlin, their alienation from the rest of the world 
through the fostering of pre-existing xenophobic rhetoric and the implementation of 
nationalist driven soft annexation and hybrid warfare tactics meant to destabilize Eastern 
Europe and limit Western encroachment. All of this, I argue, is done to re-create a geo-
political buffer zone against Western incursion both in a physical and ideological sense- 
physically by destabilizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as annexing Crimea from 
Ukraine and fostering separatist warfare in the Donbas region, and ideologically by 
painting the West as an oppressor determined to re-create the East in its own visage. I 
will also discuss the effect Russia’s actions on the international stage have had on 
surrounding Eastern European countries and the threats they face from Russia today. 
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1. Introduction 
        
       The setting is late February 2014. For anyone in the streets of Kiev at the time, they 
are unaware that they are about to play a pivotal role in the history of their country, and 
in effect the world. The people of Ukraine are out in full voice. The past several months 
have been taxing, as President Viktor Yanukovych has tested their patience. A few 
months prior, the people of Ukraine had been one step closer to joining the European 
Union, a step that they clearly supported and endorsed, as their presence on the streets 
showed. It was a step that would have brought them farther away from the shadow of 
Russia, a nation with which Ukraine shares a very complicated and intertwined history. 
With the help of pressure applied by President Vladimir Putin, this dream was quickly 
destroyed. Yanukovych had turned his back on the European Union, which in effect saw 
him, and Ukraine, move closer to Russia. This was a message not only to the world, but 
also to the Ukrainian people, and it was one they could not tolerate. The Ukrainian people 
saw this move for what it was; an attempt to appease a regional power that was very 
much intent on reestablishing itself as dominant. So they marched. 
       The people of Ukraine were unaware at the time perhaps, but what began with 
protests and marches would end in violence, the ousting of their President, the annexation 
of Crimea, and the beginning of various separatist movements that would tear their 
country apart. This, as we know it today, is known as the Ukraine crisis. The Ukraine 
crisis is the ongoing effect of a larger strategy, or set of strategies, perpetrated and carried 
out by one of the original conflicts main players: Russia. As mentioned earlier, Russia, 
and by extension President Putin, was responsible for applying pressure onto President 
Yanukovych to thwart its growing relations with the European Union. This application of 
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“pressure” is a vague way of hinting at Russia’s very evident involvement in a shift in 
position and alignment of Ukraine, or rather, the prevention of one that, if carried out, 
would have been a direct threat to the Kremlin and their place in the international 
community. The Ukraine crisis is simply one example of Russia's attempts to counter any 
sort of Western influence on a region that historically it has held under its dominion. The 
Russia-Georgia war of 2008 that saw Georgia lose control over both the regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia was also spurred on by the meddling of the Kremlin. It too, 
was an intervention that still resonates today, ten years later, as it too has not come to a 
full conclusion. 
       At the same time as these interventions have taken place, scholars who study Russia 
would have noticed a marked change in domestic Russian politics over the course of the 
last two decades. As Russia has intervened within Eastern Europe, there has been 
overwhelming support for its actions among the Russian people. In what would infuriate 
many a populace, the Kremlin’s moves have seen sanctions cripple the Russian economy, 
leaving many living outside of St. Petersburg and Moscow in economic turmoil, and yet, 
support for Putin remains strong. The question then is, what accounts for this? The 
answer: a marked rise in Russian nationalism. The people have embraced a very Russo- 
ethnocentric stance that has turned them against much of the West, especially the United 
States and European Union, as well as many “outsiders”, be it those of different ethnic, 
religious, or racial groups, that try to make their home within Russia’s borders. However, 
this rise in nationalism is almost considered normal, especially when taking into account 
the times we live in. Many countries across the world have seen the rise of parties and 
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movements calling for the defense of national identity and culture especially following 
the ongoing refugee crisis and threat of terrorism.  
       The phenomena of Russian nationalism and the events in Ukraine and Georgia are 
heavily intertwined. Looking first at both The Georgian Conflict of 2008 and the Ukraine 
crisis, both have similar beginnings with regards to Russian involvement. Russia’s 
presence in both conflicts indicates that they indeed had a stake in the conflicts outcome, 
which, in both cases, has not come into full fruition yet. Both conflicts were spurred on 
by a deeper force, one that transcends mere intervention. In both conflicts the parties 
involved were influenced by the upsurge in nationalism and evident will to separate from 
the nation they were originally part of. This pattern was evident in the case of Georgia in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and later in Ukraine’s case in Crimea and the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions. Both Georgia and Ukraine have become victims of processes known as 
soft annexation and hybrid warfare. Both processes rely on the exploitation of socio- 
political conditions that facilitate a situation and climate that allows for easy intervention 
within the manipulated country or region. It is here then, that the idea of nationalism 
becomes crucial. Regarding Russia’s own blend of soft annexation and hybrid warfare, 
nationalism becomes key both domestically and internationally. Domestically the 
Kremlin binds the nation’s population to their government by harnessing nationalism to 
garner support and unity that is unaffected by the Kremlin’s actions and their 
consequences. This is done by mobilizing Russians against groups or countries presented 
as Russia’s greatest enemies, all in the effort to prevent internal collapse.  Internationally, 
Russian nationalism inspires pro-Russian groups and ethnic enclaves to help increase 
Russian dominion over the former Soviet republics and to stem the flow of Western 
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influence in regions too close to Russian borders. Hence, I intend to argue that the 
Kremlin has harnessed and cultivated a rise in Russian nationalism that has been the fuel 
for both internal and external politics. Internally, the rise of nationalism has solidified the 
Kremlin’s hold on the people, by enabling Putin’s government to present itself as the 
protector of Russians from external incursion from the West and non-Russian actors. 
Externally, Russian nationalism has provided support as well as a basis for hybrid 
warfare and the annexation of former Soviet territories, in effect creating a geopolitical 
buffer zone between itself and the West in the attempt to stem any derailment in the 
nations resurgence as a formidable power.  
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2. Russian Nationalism- The Beginnings 
       
        To begin, it is important for one to establish a definition for what nationalism is and 
what it entails. Lowell L. Barrington quotes Michael Ignatieff’s definition of nationalism. 
Nationalism, Ignatieff observes is “...a notion that combines the political idea of 
territorial self-determination, the cultural idea of the nation as one's primary identity, and 
a moral idea of justification of action to protect the rights of the nation against the 
other.”1 This definition embodies what much of the world sees as nationalism: a feeling 
of pride for, and identification with, one's country. This, at first glance, resembles 
patriotism. The difference, at least for scholars such as Barrington, lies in the second part 
of Ignatieff’s definition of nationalism, which speaks to the “moral idea” of justification 
of action in defense of a nation against the other. Barrington argues that nationalism is a 
process as well as an idea. “Nationalism, he argues, “can be defined as an organized 
endeavor to control the national homeland. Some stress that this struggle must turn the 
homeland into an independent state; others would stop short of the requirement that the 
group seek its own state, accepting struggles for territorial autonomy within an existing 
state as nationalism.”2 Hence, it would be appropriate to say that nationalism is both idea 
and process. One of the most extreme examples of idea meeting process and action came 
in the form of the Serbian program of “ethnic cleansing” in the 1990’s. Craig Calhoun 
notes that the policy of ethnic cleansing, “...like all of nationalism and ethnic politics, 
depended on social constructions of identity, mobilized members of the chosen ethnic 
                                               
1Barrington, Lowell W. "Nation" and "Nationalism": The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science”. 
Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 4. (December 1997). p. 713. 
2 Barrington, Lowell W. "Nation" and "Nationalism": The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science”. 
Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 4. (December 1997). p. 714. 
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group only unevenly, and served the interests of some participants far more than others.”3 
It stands to reason that nationalism is malleable in definition and can be manipulated by 
political leaders. It is nationalism’s ability to be both idea and process that makes it such 
a powerful social and political tool. 
        The beginnings of Russian nationalism can be traced to the Romanov empire. The 
Romanov Tsars often used nationalism as a means of Russification, itself a means to 
“demonstrate Russian political and cultural domination of national regions primarily in 
the western parts of the Empire.”4 The policy of Russification sought to spread Russian 
culture, identity, and language throughout the empire as a unifying and dominating force. 
The Romanov empire sought to create one unified populace. One means they used was 
linguistic Russification. For example, the Romanovs banned the use of “Polish” Latin in 
the Ukrainian language, and often had Ukrainian nationalists emphasize the use of the 
Cyrillic alphabet in Ukrainian texts and literature.5 With measures such as this, the 
Romanov empire sought to bring together the peoples of Eastern Europe under one 
banner and instill Russian identity, as one common language does. This cultivation of a 
common identity would insure Russian dominance over the region, consolidating its 
power and influence. 
       Though the Romanov empire fell into decline and succumbed to revolution in 1917, 
the idea of Russian nationalism endured. In the first two decades of the 20th century, 
Russian nationalism found its way into the hands of the very revolutionaries that sought 
                                               
3 Calhoun, Craig. “Nationalism and Ethnicity”. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 19 (1993), pp. 211-212. 
4 Wortman, Richard. “Scenarios of Power: From Alexander II to the abdication of Nicholas II”. Princeton 
University Press. (1995). p. 526. 
5Malte, Rolf. “Reviewed Work(s): The Romanov Empire and Nationalism Essays in the Methodology of 
Historical Research by Alexei MILLER”. Cahiers du Monde Russe, Vol. 50, No. 4. (October-December 
2009). p. 888. 
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to reconstruct power within Russia. According to scholars such as Veljko Vujacic, the 
idea of Russian nationalism as we know it started in the 1920’s with Soviet nationality 
policy.6 At the time, various ethnicities within USSR territories began to create “union 
republics and autonomous republics” that began to section off territories for their given 
ethnicities. This led to an extremely diverse communist party, but also turned the Soviet 
Union into an “incubator of new nations” instead of a “melting pot” of cohesiveness.7 
With so many different budding nations and ethnicities, it would stand to reason that this 
would be detrimental to the idea of a unified Soviet Union. During this time, traditional 
Russia and ethnic Russians were regarded as the oppressors of smaller national groups. A 
need for cohesion amongst these states for the good of the Soviet empire seemed like it 
would be paramount to Moscow, however Vujacic argues that ethnic Russiann’ exalted 
status status in the Soviet Union was not necessarily threatened. The Bolsheviks, for 
example, used the term Russia synonymously with “Soviet Union”, even after borders for 
Soviet States were drawn up.8 Bolshevik overtones of inclusivity hid a distinction that 
still left the ethnic Russian people at the top of the Soviet power structure and ensured 
that they were the focal point of the Union, ensuring that the Soviet Union remained 
predominantly Russian. 
     During the early years of the USSR, Russian nationalism took yet another turn in its 
development towards what we see it as today. This took place under the Josef Stalin Era. 
Although Stalin started showing nationalist sentiment and an inclination towards 
                                               
6 Vujacic, Veljko. “Stalinism and Russian Nationalism: A Reconceptualization”. Post-Soviet Affairs Vol. 
23, No. 2. (2007). p. 159. 
7 Vujacic, Veljko. “Stalinism and Russian Nationalism: A Reconceptualization”. Post-Soviet Affairs Vol. 
23, No. 2. (2007).  p. 159-160. 
8  Vujacic, Veljko. “Stalinism and Russian Nationalism: A Reconceptualization”. Post-Soviet Affairs Vol. 
23, No. 2. (2007). p.161. 
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harnessing it to benefit his power in the 1920’s and early 1930s, he began to truly 
brandish nationalist rhetoric with conviction after the conclusion of World War II.9 A 
decree issued by the Central Committee of the All Soviet Communist Party, (VKP) in 
1948 is a staunch example of this. As Konstantin Azadovskii mentions in his work, the 
decree was issued based on denouncing an opera called “The Great Friendship” by V. 
Muradelli for misleading the public impression that the peoples of the Caucasus, namely 
Georgians or Ossetians, waged war with the Soviet Union as it came into power between 
1918 and 1920.10 The VKP denied this as being true, placing blame on both Ingushetians 
and the Chechens. The reason, as Azadovskii points out, that this was significant is that 
both the Chechen and the Ingush people had been deported in large numbers in 1944 and 
were still living in exile. Azadovskii points to this incident as a moment of both 
propaganda and the stoking of Russian nationalism, and the dangerous power it 
possessed, namely that of being able to unite a populace against a certain foe.11 It 
depicted the Chechens and Ingush as enemies of the state, which in turn justified their 
deportation to other sections of the USSR. It would be actions such as this that would lay 
the groundworks for the use of nationalism to aid in the achievement of political agenda. 
Stoking animosity toward groups, actors, or entire nations or regions became standard 
practice for the Soviet state and has been harnessed by the leadership of the Russian 
Federation as well.  
                                               
9  Azadovskii, Konstantin. “From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism”.  Journal of Cold War Studies. Vol. 
4, No.1. (Winter 2002). p. 66.  
10 Azadovskii, Konstantin. “From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism”.  Journal of Cold War Studies. Vol. 
4, No.1. (Winter 2002). p. 66. 
11 Azadovskii, Konstantin. “From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism”.  Journal of Cold War Studies. Vol. 
4, No.1. (Winter 2002). p. 66.  
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      As the Soviet Union expanded, nationalism endured within its plans as it consolidated 
its power over Eastern Bloc. It is important to note however that, during the Soviet era 
following Stalin, it never took on a singular, uniform face that it could be identified by. 
Scholars such as Yitzhak Brudny are quick to highlight that Russian nationalist 
intellectuals differed in opinion on the role that nationalism should play in the Soviet 
Union. Brudny notes that these nationalists were split into two groups, the “nation 
builders” and “empire savers.” 12 Brudny also notes that most Russians viewed the Soviet 
Union as a nation state rather than an empire, making the former group more prevalent 
than the latter. Brudny makes the distinction between three types of nationalism that were 
prevalent during the period between 1953 and 1991, these being liberal, conservative and 
radical nationalism.13 Liberal nationalism, as Brudny describes, found its origins in the 
early Post -Stalinist era and was a part of the liberal reformist movement, but did not 
agree with Russian liberal reformers and their, “...excessive preoccupation with 
individual rights and did not share their indiscriminate adoption of Western political, 
social and moral ills of the Russian nation.”14 Liberal nationalists believed that radical 
political and economic reform was necessary, especially in the realm of the Stalinist 
legacy in Soviet politics.15 This form of nationalism as Brudny mentions, was unlike 
conservative and radical nationalism in the sense that it did not advocate for anti - 
intellectualism and xenophobia. Brudny’s conception of conservative nationalism is 
starkly different. Contrary to the “liberal” nationalists, who were open to political reform, 
                                               
12 Brudny,Yitzhak. “Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State 1953 - 1991”. Harvard 
University Press. (1998). p.8. 
13 Brudny,Yitzhak. “Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State 1953 - 1991”. Harvard 
University Press. (1998).pp.8-9. 
14 Brudny,Yitzhak. “Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State 1953 - 1991”. Harvard 
University Press. (1998).p.10. 
15 Brudny,Yitzhak. “Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State 1953 - 1991”. Harvard 
University Press. (1998).pp. 10-11. 
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conservative nationalists focused mainly on the hardships of the peasantry and the lower 
classes, as well as the “moral corruption of society brought about by a modern urban 
lifestyle and the Westernized urban intelligentsia they held responsible for this 
corruption.”16 This form of nationalism and its liberal counterpart did however share 
antipathy for the Stalinist era, blaming it for many of the hardships the Russian populace 
now faced. However, conservative nationalism leaned more towards radical nationalism 
than the liberal sort, as Brudny explains. Radical nationalism exhibited a “militant 
rejection of Western values that had been penetrating the Soviet Union since the end of 
the Stalin era”.17 Radical nationalism emphasized the necessity of an authoritarian state 
that could stop the spread of Western ideology.18 Radical nationalists favored the 
conditions that a Stalinist- like era provided. They blamed the fall of the USSR on the 
penetration of Western ideology. Present day Russian nationalists emulate Soviet-era 
radical nationalists and favor a state that keeps Russia free from Western incursions. It is 
no surprise then, that scholars often view Putin’s current brand of nationalism as 
reminiscent of the Stalinist era, in a time where one of the Kremlin’s main imperatives is 
stopping any Western influences from tainting their populace and turning them against 
the government. 
        Throughout the USSR, the spread of Russian language and literature was vast. In 
schools in Poland, for example, it was required of children to learn the Russian language, 
undoubtedly an attempt to bring the Soviet states together through a common dominant 
                                               
16 Brudny,Yitzhak. “Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State 1953 - 1991”. Harvard 
University Press. (1998).pp. 11-12. 
17 Brudny,Yitzhak. “Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State 1953 - 1991”. Harvard 
University Press. (1998).p. 12. 
18Brudny,Yitzhak. “Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State 1953 - 1991”. Harvard 
University Press. (1998).p. 12. 
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language, as the Romanovs had done during their time in power. Scholars such Barbara 
A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver have conducted studies that show Russification 
influenced ethnic re identification within the USSR. Ethnic re identification, which 
Anderson et. al use as synonymous with assimilation, is defined as the “inclusion of small 
groups (or of separate individuals) of one people in the body of another-usually a larger 
or more developed Community."19 The results of Anderson et. al’s studies show that 
through ethnic Russification between 1959 and 1970, “...Russians gained an estimated 
599.9 thousand in the 0-38 age cohort (ages 11-49 in 1970), while non- Russians lost an 
estimated 638.5 thousand” through populations who re identified as such.20 Clearly, 
Russification was employed to keep the Russian population, or the population of those 
who identified as Soviet rather than their individual ethnicity, high enough to continue to 
stoke a binding nationalistic flame. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
19 Anderson, Barbara A. and Brian D. Silver. “Estimating Russification of Ethnic Identity Among Non-
Russians in the USSR”.  Demography, Vol. 20, No. 4 (November 1983). p. 462. 
20 Anderson, Barbara A. and Brian D. Silver. “Estimating Russification of Ethnic Identity Among Non-
Russians in the USSR”.  Demography, Vol. 20, No. 4 (November 1983). p.479 
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3. Post-Soviet Nationalism 
        
       In an ironic twist of fate, one of the driving forces that put an end to the Soviet Union 
was in fact nationalism. The early 1970’s saw the first push for reform come from Poland 
of all places. As one of the Soviet satellite states, the rise in nationalism in Poland is 
important to discuss as it was one of the first Soviet controlled territories begin the 
uprising across Eastern Europe. It was exiled Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski who 
first tried to formulate a plan that would lead Poland, and eventually other nations out of 
the Soviet Union’s grasp. In "Hope and Hopelessness," Kolakowski maintained that 
because the Soviet system was, “entangled in contradictions” and that the current system 
held itself together by preventing resistance within civil society, it could be changed via 
social resistance.21 This was noted by activists such as Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, 
who, in the 1970’s, put together the Komitet Obrony Robotnikow [The Workers Defense 
Committee], or KOR.22 Movements such as Ruch Obrony Praw Czlowieka i Obywatela, 
(ROCiO), which translates to “The Movement of Rights of the Human and Citizen” 
followed. These organization engaged in social resistance in the hope that they could help 
alleviate the grasp that the Soviet Union held over the nation. It would be these social 
movements that would be the foundations upon which the Solidarity movement was built. 
Solidarnosc, as the movement was known, came to the forefront of Polish society in the 
fall of 1980 when Polish communists granted the movement legal recognition.23 It was 
the first time since 1945 that there had been a fully autonomous organization that was 
                                               
21Bernhard, Michael. “Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central Europe”.  Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 2. (Summer, 1993). pp. 312-313. 
22 Bernhard, Michael. “Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central Europe”.  Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 2. (Summer, 1993). p. 313. 
23 Kubik, Jan and Amy Lynch. “The Original Sin of Poland’s Third Republic: Discounting “Solidarity” and 
its Consequences for Political Reconciliation”.  Polish Sociological Review, Vol. I.(153). (2006). p. 13. 
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beyond Soviet control. In the year that followed, martial law was declared and Solidarity 
was banned. Unfortunately for the Soviets, the movement had grown much too large to 
stop.24 Solidarnosc did what many other movements had failed to do, and that was 
separate society from the ruling regime.25 Nationalism role in this was direct and 
impactful. As scholars such as Jon E. Fox and Peter Vermeersch contend, “Solidarity 
…relied almost exclusively on its form – the symbols, visual images and slogans of the 
opposition movement of the 1980s ‘‘we, the nation’’ against ‘‘them, the communists’’, 
‘‘we, the Catholics’’ against ‘‘them, the atheists’’, and so on.”26 Solidarity’s used 
nationalism, as Fox et. al. state, as a motivator to identify who the enemy was, namely the 
Communist party. That in turn helped fracture the communist regimes legitimacy within 
the country.27  Just as nationalism had been used to mobilize a populace, for example 
during the Stalinist era, especially when looking back at the example provided by the 
decree issued by the Central Committee of the All Soviet Communist Party, (VKP) in 
1948 which was meant to target the Chechen and the Ingush people, the same tactic was 
used against the communist hierarchy to unite the Polish people under one common front 
to face the incursion that the existence of the Soviet Union and communist regime 
represented. In time, nationalist movements began to sprout across the Baltic States, and 
then spread over to the rest of the Eastern Bloc. In 1988, representatives of varying 
nationalist movements, including those in Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Estonia established contact and created a coordinating committee amongst 
                                               
24Kubik, Jan and Amy Lynch. “The Original Sin of Poland’s Third Republic: Discounting “Solidarity” and 
its Consequences for Political Reconciliation”.  Polish Sociological Review, Vol. I.(153). (2006). p. 13. 
25Kubik, Jan and Amy Lynch. “The Original Sin of Poland’s Third Republic: Discounting “Solidarity” and 
its Consequences for Political Reconciliation”.  Polish Sociological Review, Vol. I.(153). (2006). p. 13. 
26 Fox, Jon E. and Peter Vermeersch. “Backdoor Nationalism”. European Journal of Sociology. Vol. 51, 
No. 2. (2010), p. 333. 
27 Fox, Jon E. and Peter Vermeersch. “Backdoor Nationalism”. European Journal of Sociology. Vol. 51, 
No. 2. (2010), p. 333. 
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themselves. These groups met, shared documents and ideas and material support when 
they could, allowing nationalism to take on a concrete form where, “nationalist 
paradigms were consciously exported and borrowed, organizational resources were 
shared and challenging groups sought inspiration from one another.”28 Just as nationalism 
had given, it had taken as well, unraveling the bindings of the Soviet Union in the same 
fashion that they had been brought together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
28 Beissinger, Mark R. “Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism” Contemporary European 
History Vol. 18, No.3. (August 2009). p. 340. 
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4. Russia Under Yeltsin- The Precursor to Putin 
       
        The years that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union were a tumultuous time for 
Russia. The country lost its identity and vast swaths of territory. For any country, this 
would have been difficult. Yeltsin came into power in June of 1991, and formerly took up 
the role as Russia first president. The country was in decline, and the population was 
suffering. In 1989, it was calculated that an average citizen spent 40-68 hours standing in 
store lines a month when looking to go shopping for their needs.29 By 1991, polls showed 
that 1 in 8 respondents had not seen meat in stores controlled by the state, and less than 
one in 12 had seen butter.30 In fall of 1991, it was predicted by CNN that the oncoming 
winter would result in starvation for many Russians.31 It is important to note then that the 
transition period after the Soviet Union's fall started off with complications, which did 
not make Yeltsin’s job any easier.  
          Unlike his Soviet counterparts, which had often used nationalism as a glue for the 
state, Yeltsin did not subscribe to any concrete form of nationalism According to scholars 
such as Peter Rutland, the farthest he came was during his pre- presidency days when he, 
“...used appeals of Russian sovereignty to undermine the position of Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev. But Yeltsin never subscribed to a clearly-articulated concept of 
Russian national identity. For Yeltsin, the most important symbol of the new Russian 
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state was – Yeltsin himself.”32 Instead of trying to consolidate central control through 
pushing the idea of a single Russian identity, he often did the opposite. His focus leaned 
towards implementing economic reforms. To highlight this shift, Yeltsin was a vast 
supporter of self-rule on behalf of the various ethnic republics that had sprung up after 
the Soviet Union’s collapse.33 Yeltsin famously said that these republics should “take as 
much sovereignty as [they] could swallow” during a speech in Kazan, the capital of 
Tatarstan, one of the ethnic republics in question.34 Yeltsin’s “hands off” approach to 
these ethnic republics was very much a double-edged blade, however. Although giving 
these ethnic republics leave to set up their own governing systems and giving them 
special minority status helped Yeltsin during the 1996 presidential elections, with the 
number of voters in favor of him rising by 8% in the aforementioned republics, his 
policies often led to conflict. Much of the conflict revolved around ethnic republics such 
as Tatarstan and Chechnya, the former of which declared itself a sovereign state after a 
referendum held in March of 1992, which saw 61% of the population vote in favor of 
independence, and the latter of which declared its independence in October of 1991, a 
move that eventually led to war.35 While Yeltsin improved his relations with the ethnic 
republics, conflicts such as these did not sit well with the general Russian populace.  
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       On top of these debacles involving ethnic republics, Yeltsin’s presidency did little to 
reduce poverty levels. Andrei Schleifer and Daniel Treisman indicate that, in the early 
1990’s, “the poverty rate was highest among children aged 7 to 15; among adults, it was 
higher among women than men.”36 A collapse in what the state could provide throughout 
the late 1980’s and early 1990’s left many Russian’s in a state of poverty and 
hopelessness. The democratic reforms and change Yeltsin offered seemed promising at 
first. But during his presidency, Russia saw not a dip, but a spike, in poverty rates. As 
Olena Nikolayenko highlights, poverty rates throughout the 1990’s rose from 11.5 in 
1990, to 26.2 in 1995, and reached a high of 34.2 in 1999.37 Hence on top of political 
turmoil, the Yeltsin era was one of economic privation. The political chaos and mounting 
economic problems did not endear him to many Russians. 
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5. Russia Under Putin- A Return to Nationalism: 
       
        In many ways Yeltsin left Russia in 1998 worse off than he’d found it when his 
presidency began. Not only was the country in economic tailspin, it had fought through 
taxing conflicts, among them the Chechen war. For a country in Russia’s state, Yeltsin 
had clearly not been the answer. Yeltsin’s shortcoming, however, left the door open for 
Vladimir Putin. Putin’s rise to power can be contributed to the fact that Russia was 
lacking a strong leader, and Putin offered just that. Unlike Yeltsin, Putin’s rise was based 
on protecting and elevating the Russian people, uniting them under a single banner and 
bringing them out of economic turmoil. It was using this turmoil that Putin staked his 
claim to the Russian presidency in 1998. The West have often criticized Putin's use of 
both the Chechen war and control over media outlets as one of the main reasons for his 
popularity amongst voters.38 Following his election, Putin’s path to power was made 
quite easy. Although the country had been a “democracy” under Yeltsin, the government 
structure made it easy for Putin to exploit. Sergei Rogov of the Moscow Institute of USA 
and Canada studies is quoted in stating that, “We [Russia] adopted a constitution towards 
the end of 1993 which gave enormous authority to the executive without appropriate 
checks and balances. The legislative branch is weak and is dominated by executive 
authority. The judiciary is not independent...Yeltsin abandoned the notion of checks and 
balances and created a democracy for the bureaucracy and operated by the 
bureaucracy.”39 With a weak government structure created, as Rogov highlights, for the 
purposes of bureaucracy, Putin had free reign in shaping the direction Russia would now 
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take. Consolidating control over this bureaucracy, in Putin eyes, was the first step in 
improving Russia. He wasted no time in transitioning the Kremlin into a well-oiled 
machine to fit his purposes. In his first term from 2000 to 2004, Putin replaced elected 
governors in the upper house of the Russian parliament with his own appointees, sent 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a prominent oil tycoon, to prison for politically motivated 
reasons and installed Kremlin-vetted appointees seven Russian sectors to make sure that 
the regional laws conformed with the federal norms he would begin to propose.40 It is 
often argued that, although some of these actions may indeed be corrupt, the state of 
Russia after the Yeltsin era mandated that Putin take this “strong leader” stance to take 
control of the spiraling Russian economy. Boris Jordan, one of the key figures in the 
setup of Renaissance Capital, which is one of Russia’s largest investment banks, was 
quoted in a 2004 interview saying that, “I am not sure that Putin views the consolidation 
of political power as necessary for promoting economic reform. I think he views the 
consolidation of control over his own bureaucracy as promoting economic reforms.”41 
While it can be argued that Putin’s actions clearly overstep the boundaries that delineate 
control over bureaucracy and consolidation of political power, as we will see, one thing is 
clear: the economy under Putin has improved. Under Putin, there has been an increase in 
“energy exports”, with the building of new pipelines at the forefront of this. Simeon 
Djankov highlights that Russia has diversified its exports to previously untapped markets, 
these of which include China, Japan and Korea by building and expanding the Trans-
Siberian oil pipeline, as well as the Sakhalin– Khabarovsk–Vladivostok gas pipeline 
                                               
40 Desai, Padma. “Russian Retrospectives on Reforms from Yeltsin to Putin”. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. Vol 9, No.1. (Winter 2005). p. 102. 
41 Desai, Padma. “Russian Retrospectives on Reforms from Yeltsin to Putin”. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. Vol 9, No.1. (Winter 2005). p. 103. 
 23 
which can be found in the Russian Far East.42 One of the most notable deals signed by 
Russia with regards to its pipeline systems was with China in May of 2014.  The 
agreement was signed between the two nations to deliver over 400 billion dollars worth 
of oil within the next 30 years.43 It is also worth noting that the Russian economy saw a 
growth in GDP from 764 billion USD to around 2 trillion USD between the years of 2006 
and 2014.44 Of course, the Russian elite enjoyed most of this growth. Since Putin has 
come into power, extreme wealth in the Russian economy has gone up significantly, with 
111 Russian’s finding themselves on the Forbes World’s Billionaire list, which increased 
from 42 in the Yeltsin years.45 This has also been followed by a rise of billionaires close 
to Putin such as Vladimir Yakunin, Yury Kovalchuk and Roman Abramovich, replacing 
the old guard of Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky and the like which thrived 
under Yeltsin, and even leading to their exile.46 Even in this sense, Putin has shifted and 
made changes to the Russian hierarchy that fit him and his agenda. By replacing those 
who hold monetary and economic power, he has created a new hierarchy that has allowed 
his grasp to tighten over his position of power. This would of course only be the 
beginning for Putin, however, as he would take his role of reinventing Russia by 
manipulating nationalism, which will be discussed below.  
       Nationalism under the Putin regime has taken on a variation of forms, depending on 
what it has been called to do. In the beginning of his term as President, and then later as 
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Prime Minister, the role nationalism played was not, as scholars such as Luke March 
would put it, “militaristic or expansionist”. March indicates that, particularly before the 
Georgian conflict of 2008, Russian nationalism was, “conservative as opposed to 
reactionary, and that is oriented toward pragmatism, not ideology.”47 Nationalism during 
the first half of the Putin era, (we shall call it this, because although Medvedev was 
president for several years, it is obvious he only held that role in name), was 
conservative, and focused on separating themselves, at least at face value, from more 
extremist versions nationalism. March is clear to point however that nationalism was 
indeed used in the domestic sphere by using, “more aggressive ethno-nationalist 
sentiment in the domestic sphere for legitimacy and mobilization purposes.”48 Hence with 
this we get our first glimpse at the true image of the current state of Russian nationalism-- 
a phenomenon that has been molded over centuries by various rulers into a means for 
manipulation for political gain and domestic stability, with its basis founded upon a 
heavily guarded idea of the Russian people in need of protection from the outside world, 
which is filled with enemies and ideologies that seek to harm and debilitate the Russian 
state and its populace. As we will see, the Kremlin has used already existent reserves of 
nationalism built up over years of struggle before, during and after the Soviet era to help 
pave the way for Russia’s reestablishment as a great power.  
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6. Ivan Ilyin: A Basis for the Present? 
       
       An exploration of nationalism during the Putin era cannot begin without the 
mentioning the influence on Putin of Ivan Ilyin. Ilyin, a thinker well known for his 
nationalistic inclinations, is often credited as the inspiration behind Putin's true domestic 
and foreign policy. Although Ilyin was born of a German mother and Russian father, he 
clearly viewed Russia as his mother country. His family on his father's side had strong 
links to the Kremlin, with his grandfather holding the post of “Keeper of the Kremlin 
Gates.” His father was born within the Kremlin, and Tsar Alexander II was reportedly his 
godfather.49 Ilyin’s strong connection with the Kremlin could be one of the many reasons 
for Putin’s fondness of Ilyin’s work, a connection to the central hub of Russian political 
power mirroring his own, a symbol of legacy and strength. But of course, such a link is 
too weak to stand on its own. A closer look a Putin’s rhetoric and political actions reveals 
that the current Russian president and Ilyin seem to be of one mind. Over the course of 
his life, Ilyin created a legacy and self-definition based upon painting the West as the 
enemy. Scholars such as Lilia Shevtsova have highlighted this as a similar facet of Putin's 
rhetoric, “Western nations cannot stand Russian uniqueness. … They seek to dismember 
Russia’, Ilyin complained while calling for the “Russian national dictatorship.” Putin has 
not yet talked of “national dictatorship,” but he loves to complain about Western efforts 
to back Russia into a corner.”50 It was not simply the West that Ilyin saw as the enemy. 
During World War One Ilyin supported Hitler's treatment of the Jews by equating them 
with the Bolshevik movement, which he saw as a full eruption of the disease that Western 
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democracy had caused.51 He attempted to persuade Russians that the Jewish people were 
“agents of Bolshevism”, which was not an accident, as, according to Timothy Snyder, 
most Jews were not communists, and most communists did not ascribe to the Jewish 
faith, which leads one to believe that his idea of “judeo bolshevism” was the use of 
religious prejudice as a tool to unify the Russian people against a common “enemy.” 52 
This sort of focusing the Russian people against a specific enemy has been mirrored by 
various Soviet leaders, such as Stalin in his alienation and deportation of the Ingushetian 
and the Chechen people, as well as with regards to Putin with his rhetoric framing the 
West as the enemy. Ilyin’s political ideas also emphasized the role of the Russian 
Orthodox church and “...traditional values that would bring about the spiritual renewal of 
the Russian people,” who he believed were heavily influenced by the Western political 
and social constructs he so opposed.53 This is mirrored is Putin rhetoric and policies. For 
example, in the 2000 National Security Concept, states that, “Assurance of the Russian 
Federation’s national security also includes protecting the cultural and spiritual-moral 
legacy and the historical traditions and standards of public life.”54 This document 
appeared before Putin's interest in Ilyin’s work became clear, so Putin was already 
inclined to see himself as the guardian of Russian culture and identity. Not until 2006 
would Putin openly begin to quote Ilyin in his speeches. In one speech, Putin referred 
directly to Ilyin, stating that his ideas reflected principles that the Russian state should 
stand by. “We must,” Putin said, “always be ready to ward off potential external 
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aggression and acts of international terrorism. We must be able to answer any and all 
attempts to put external political pressure on Russia, including those that aim to 
strengthen their own position at our expense.”55 Moreover, Putin arranged for the 
reinternment of Ilyin’s remains in Russia, and the head of his political party, Dmitry 
Medvedev, has been known to recommend Ilyin’s writing to Russian youth.56 Statements 
and actions such as these make Ilyins’s influence on Putin’s thinking very clear. Putin has 
sought to legitimize his rule in part by anchoring it in Ilyin’s nationalist ideas, especially 
by stressing the need to stand tall against the West.57 Moreover, Putin has drawn Ilyin’s 
ideas to call for unity among the Russian populace and to resurrect patriotism based in 
part on enmity towards the West-and enmity from the West. This has helped Putin 
burnish his image as not just president and leader, but as a pious leader who believes in 
Russian Orthodox ideals, and acts as Russia’s “savior” from the machinations of foreign 
enemies.  
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7. Xenophobia: “The Monster That is the Other”: 
        
       Having established the basis upon which Russian nationalism has been founded and 
how it has morphed over the years, it is important now to look at some of its more 
specific facets, the first of which is xenophobia. The term xenophobia refers to, in its 
most basic form, a hate and fear of individuals and groups that come from countries and 
ethnicities other than one’s own. As aforementioned, the role that xenophobia plays as a 
facet of Russian nationalism is the alienation and targeting of the outside world as the 
enemy. It is important to note that xenophobia, as one of the pillars of Russian 
nationalism, while it has not directly been openly referenced by the Kremlin, has played a 
pivotal role in helping maintain levels of domestic cohesion. In effect, xenophobia has 
been a resource for the Kremlin to tap into, not through policy, but by ignoring it and 
letting it grow into a force that helps provide fuel for a domestic agenda that demands 
unity. Xenophobia lends itself to this by framing the Russian people a separate from the 
“other” or the “outsider”. The distinction of the Russian people from the “other” has 
become a crucial pillar upon which Putin has built his power. Yet the rise of xenophobia 
predates Putin by many years. In the 1970’s for example, there was a massive migration 
of Russian Jews leaving the country for both the United States and Israel, after years of 
having lived under the very anti-religious regimes of Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, 
under each of which Yiddish and Hebrew texts were largely banned.58 Feeling 
unwelcome they were forced to leave Russia behind seeking more accepting pastures. 
Their mass migration was seen by many as a positive, as rates of anti-Semitism within the 
country have always been high. According to Vladimir Shlapentokh, data from as 
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recently as 2007 shows that 13% of Russians support an all-out ban on Jewish 
organizations within Russia, 18% believe there should be a limit as to how many Jews 
live within Russia’s borders, and 34% have been recorded to not condemn anti-Semites. 
In tandem with this, 44% believe the Jewish people should be limited in their 
involvement within the political, business, law, and educational spheres.59 
       Although xenophobia has been a general facet of Russian society, the major spike 
that saw its levels skyrocket occurred in 1991, and then once again in 2000. The fall of 
the Soviet Union saw many countries and ethnic groups become the targets of hatred 
throughout Russia. According to Shlapentokh, this is due to the emergence of several 
former Soviet States as enemies of the Russian state. Statistics provided by Shlapentokh 
highlight that in 2006, 35% of the public viewed Ukraine’s stance towards Russia as 
negative, which is telling because a similar percentage stated the same regarding US 
policies.60 Other statistics also mention a growing hatred for the Baltic Republics and 
Georgia. Two of the three examples mentioned have become targets of Russian military 
action, which is a telling sign that the xenophobic enmity between the Russian population 
and outsider states and ethnicities surely played into the hands of Russian foreign policy, 
as the public would have had little complaints pertaining to both of Russia’s recent 
military excursions.  
       The manifestations of xenophobia within Russia have been known to be extreme. 
Over the course of the last two decades, “extremist crime” has skyrocketed. According to 
a report submitted to the UN Universal Periodic Review, in 2009, xenophobic related 
                                               
59 Shlapentokh, Vladimir. “The Hatred of Others: The Kremlin’s Powerful but Risky Weapon”. World 
Affairs, Vol 169. No.3. (Winter 2007).  p. 136. 
60 Shlapentokh, Vladimir. “The Hatred of Others: The Kremlin’s Powerful but Risky Weapon”. World 
Affairs, Vol 169. No.3. (Winter 2007).  p. 136. 
 30 
violence rose from 130 registered extremist acts in 2004, to 152, 263 and 356 in 2005, 
2006 and 2007 respectively.61 One of the most striking outlets of this violence has been 
European football hooliganism. On August 23rd, 2012, for example, both AZ Alkmaar 
and Anzhi Makhachkala held a friendly, preseason football match. In the stands, scores of 
Lokomotiv fans (a club that plays in the Russian league), stood vigil over the game. As 
the game progressed, a chant began to ring out, “Russians forward! F**k the Caucasus!” 
Anzhi, a team from Russia’s mostly Muslim Caucasus region, was renting Lokomotiv’s 
stadium in Moscow for the friendly to take place. Throughout the match, police went on 
to detain about 80 fans, but this did little to curb the ensuing violence, “...after their 
victory, groups of hooligans attacked Anzhi fans in the metro station…splattering the 
platform in blood.”62 A Russian nationalist organization later said on social media that 70 
Lokomotiv fans had taken part in the assault using traumatic pistols (handguns that fire 
rubber bullets).”63 Many scholars have tried to develop a reasoning behind this hatred of 
the “other”, and how it has spread to become so vicious. To some, it is the effect of mass 
migration into the country, leaving many Russian’s on edge.  Between the years of 1992-
1995, Hillary Pilkington highlights that migrants seeking refugee status began to pour in 
from across the old Soviet Union. Approximately 180,00 migrants from Tajikistan, 
170,000 migrants from Kazakhstan, and about 140,000 from Uzbekistan made their way 
into the Russian Federation. Migrants from Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
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Moldova made up a large part of the refugee pool as well.64 These figures show that over 
the course of the 1990’s, Russia’s became far more diverse. Pilkington notes that for a 
nation which suffers from rising mortality but falling birth rates, migration logically 
should be a good thing. This idea, however, doesn’t consider the political consequences 
that a such a steep increase in the number of foreigners had. Russia’s political situation at 
the time was fragile; the country had lost control over much of its Soviet territories. In 
these circumstances, an influx of refugees and migrants from former Soviet States would 
not be received kindly by ethnic Russians. States that had broken away from Soviet 
control were now sending people to it—the very same people which wanted to break 
from Russia’s control in the first place. At the same time however, one becomes hard 
pressed to overlook the role Russian politics has played in the manipulation of said 
xenophobia.  
As mentioned previously, anti-former Soviet State sentiment surely played a role 
in legitimizing the Kremlin’s advances on both Georgia and Ukraine. With regards to 
Ukraine, much of the animosity and distaste Russians feel towards the nation can be 
attributed to the Russian media, which often depicts Ukraine as “…Russia’s fiercest 
enemy and an ally of the United States. An army of Kremlin propagandists and 
politicians have vehemently denigrated Ukraine, gloated about its problems, and indulged 
in ethnic disparagements.”65 This is clear case where xenophobia and hatred have been 
used as a tool, or even as a weapon directed, at least at the time, at a potential political 
adversary on the international arena. Few could expect how Russia’s attitudes towards 
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“Russian identity” could unfold on the international arena, but internally it was clear that 
garnering and directing support was not difficult for the Kremlin to do. 
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8. Russian Orthodoxy and a Conservative Return to Traditionalism: 
        
       The Russian Orthodox Church is yet another facet of the current state of Russian 
nationalism, and a major tool in Putin’s arsenal for political and social control over the 
Russian people. Firstly, The Russian Orthodox Church, or ROC, is known as a pillar of 
Russian tradition and culture, and has been for centuries. The church draws its first links 
to Saint Cyril and Methodius in 863. The two men traveled north towards the Byzantine 
empire and converted Bulgaria, Serbia, and Russia to the Orthodox faith.66 The religion 
goes back over a millennium, making it one of Russia’s most traditional cornerstones. 
With Putin's will to bring Russia back to “traditionalist” Russian ideals to help keep the 
people unified, the Church seems like an obvious glue for this unification. 
       Besides the ROC’s history in Russian culture and tradition, its link with Russian 
nationalism is strong. Many members of the Church and clergy associate with nationalist 
groups. For example, the largest nationalist group in Russia, Russian National Unity 
(Russkoye natsional'noye yedinstvo), has actively worked with ROC clergy.67 Similarly, 
while the ROC has not claimed to be openly anti-Semitic, anti-Semitic texts are often 
found on sale in Orthodox churches.68 While itis true however, as some scholars such as 
Aleksandr Verhovsky argue, that an entire church or religious sect cannot be nationalist 
or xenophobic, especially when some of the most outspoken, liberal voices in Russia do 
indeed come from the ROC and its Bishops, nationalism remains an important facet 
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within the ROC, with large sects of the ROC ascribing to very radical nationalist views.69 
For Verhovsky, the phenomenon of nationalism and anti- Westernism within the Church 
is not directly a product of their faith, but more of a world outlook he calls Russian 
Orthodox Fundamentalism, which, according to Verhovsky, is in favor of, “...the 
restoration of autocracy, a state structure on the imperial model, restrictions on the Jews 
and confessions other than Orthodoxy, the status of state church for the ROC, rejection of 
the concepts of democracy and human rights (in particular, as far as freedom of 
conscience is concerned), opposition to any forms of Western influence within the 
country and struggle against such influence beyond Russia's borders, rigid paternalism by 
the state in all areas and the compulsory imposition of 'Orthodox values' in everyday life, 
culture and even the economy.”70 These views align with Putin’s idea of controlling the 
populace. If the people support an outright autocracy, and the spread of these Russian 
Orthodox fundamentalist values can be spread, manipulation and control of the populace 
is much easier. His acceptance of the Russian Orthodox religion, and through his 
parading of it when he appears publicly, be it by visiting holy sites or by wearing a cross, 
Putin inspires the people to follow suit. A leader who stands for what the people stand for 
surely cannot be the enemy, but a friend, or savior attempting to liberate them from the 
grip of the Western world. In a speech given before the Bishop’s Council of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in Moscow, President Putin stated that the Church “...inspired people to 
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constructive action and heroic deeds for the Fatherland.”71 It is this sort of sentiment for 
the Orthodoxy that brings to the forefront a side of Putin that wishes the Russian people 
to stand with him in a time where, he argues, Russia needs those willing to be 
constructive and do “heroic deeds” to ensure that Russia stays Russia, and does not 
become part of the Western world.  
       The Kremlin’s relationship with Russian Orthodoxy does not stop there. As 
aforementioned, the 2000 National Security Concept of the Putin administration created a 
link between the ROC and security of culture and tradition in Russia as being of 
paramount importance to the nation's well being. Similarly, in 2002, Patriarch Alexey II 
consecrated a church in the Lubianka, the headquarters of the Federal Security Bureau, an 
act that showed the close link the Kremlin was trying to create between the two 
institutions.72 This coming together of church and state signaled that to be Russian meant 
to be Russian Orthodox. The symbolic merging of Patriarch Alexey II’s consecration was 
a message that these two institutions stood as one to protect the Russian people and their 
identity as such. This of course extended to Russians outside the borders of Russia, 
however this will be explored a little later.  
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9. The Current State of Russian Nationalism-The Effect of Putin’s “Two 
Pillars”: 
        
       The coming together of both pillars of Russian nationalism has had important 
political consequences. Firstly, as aforementioned, football culture has become heavily 
charged with nationalist and, by extension, xenophobic rhetoric, creating a portion of the 
population that, in many cases has been at the center of violence towards outsiders. This 
violence is often geared to include individuals that were born within Russian territory, 
however do not fall under the conditions of what is seen to be truly Russian, meaning 
they do not fit the category of “russkiy” a term reserved for the ethnic Russian people, 
which has been used by Putin in speeches, namely one in particular to the Duma, during 
which he opted to not use the more inclusive “rossiyskiy”, which envelops all Russian 
“citizens”.73 This would target groups that are not inherently Russian Orthodox, which 
would explain the chants used in the AZ Alkmaar and Anzhi Makhachkala game in 2012, 
where the fans displayed their hate for the Caucuses, a predominantly Muslim region of 
Russia. The violence and hatred is not limited to hooligans on hooligans. The violence 
that took place after this game targeted individuals not because of their support for a 
given club, as it usually does in violent scenarios between hooligans of two clubs, but 
because of religious intolerance and a sense of superiority over what Lokomotiv fans and 
many other Russian hooligan groups see as ideas that threaten Russian culture and 
identity. This hatred also encompasses the realm of the clubs these groups support, and 
the image they wish their teams to carry. In 2012, for example, fans of Russian Club 
Zenit St. Petersburg released a public letter stating that they did not want black or gay 
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players representing their club.74 Much of this sentiment reflects the partnership between 
the Kremlin and the ROC. With the government spurring rhetoric that, while inexplicitly 
fuels such behavior, it can only lead to groups such as this feeling empowered, and even 
justified. If Russia is to truly only be for the “russkiy” people, hooligans may see it as 
their duty to let “the other” know that they are not welcome and that they are there to 
defend what it means to be Russian. 
       Nationalism has also been on the rise among segments of Russia’s youth. In most 
cases around the world, one would expect the older generation to be much more 
nationalistic and for youth to be more welcoming of ideas from the outside world. In the 
case of Russia, however, the rise of ethnic nationalism as is striking among youth. It has 
taken two distinct forms: a rise in youth skinhead groups and the rise of the youth 
nationalist group “Nashi”. Nashi, as an organization was founded back in 2005 with 
explicit Kremlin backing. “Nashi” translates directly to the phrase “Ours”. The group’s 
main goal, at the time of its formation, was to facilitate, “Russia’s global leadership in the 
21st century...prepare a ‘revolution of cadres’ in Russia...educate a new generation of 
state officials, and... oppose the threat of an ‘orange-revolution’ in Russia’ as well as 
large amounts of anti-fascist campaigning.”75 By simply looking at Nashi’s founding 
goals, and keeping in mind its close ties to the state, it is clear that the Kremlin uses it to 
promote nationalism among Russians. By using groups such as Nashi to plant the idea of 
ethnic nationalism in young minds, the Kremlin seeks to ensure that the next generation 
will be pro Kremlin and pro Putin. The co-opting of youth and training them as state 
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officials is a step taken by the Kremlin to groom the youth in a way that benefits the 
Kremlin’s political agenda. The more of the population the state grooms, the less dissent 
there will be. The question, then is, how has the youth group worked to groom 
individuals? In some sense, it can be argued that Nashi seems to be working to counter 
radical nationalism. The group has sent out pamphlets and stood against hyper nationalist 
sentiment, stating that, “Cultural diversity is Russia’s greatest asset in the modern world. 
Religious and ethnic cooperation empowers our country to develop further... Our 
generation’s task is to prevent the spread of fascist ideas, aggressive nationalism, 
religious intolerance and separatism that threatens the unity and territorial integrity of 
Russia…”, and at the same time, the group has also looked to Russian nationalist 
sentiments to recruit its members, an example being a march the grouped worked on in 
2007 with United Russia’s youth wing, Molodaya Gvardia.76 During this march, the 
popular slogan “Russia for the Russians” was championed. This slogan, as 
aforementioned, is used by far-right groups that imply not only anti-Western, but anti-
immigrant and outsider sentiment. While it is argued that the use of this was simply 
meant to garner support for anti-Western meddling, its connotation with anti-immigrant 
and outsider sentiment blur the lines as to where the group really stands and how they 
intend to influence Russia’s youngest generation. 
       Much more worrisome is the growth of the skinhead population. The phenomenon 
dated back to the 1990’s, when youth often emulated the behaviors of their western 
counterparts.77 Over the years since the fall of the Soviet Union, there have been massive 
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fluctuations in skinhead activity, with a dip occurring in 2008. However, skinhead groups 
have been on the rise in in recent years. Researchers from the SOVA Centre of 
Information and Analysis predicted a rise in skinhead activity following the breakout of 
the Ukraine crisis, and their predictions have not been off the mark.78 More and more 
violence follows the nationalist rhetoric that has been ingrained in political discourse, 
almost giving groups like the skinheads the justification to continue their reign of 
violence, even if Russian laws prohibit such behavior. It would seem counterintuitive to 
champion a slogan such as “Russia for the Russians” if the laws were truly meant to 
protect ethnic groups from violence. This of course then would dictate that the laws are 
simply a guise, and that actions speak louder than written law, making these laws worth 
less than the ink used to print and codify them. Instead, letting this breed of violent 
nationalism fester and go meekly challenged is productive, as it sews more enmity 
against the outside world without the Kremlin even having to mobilize the people 
themselves. In the case of the skinheads, they are harnessing a resource that simply made 
itself available due to the country’s circumstances. 
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10. When Rhetoric Fails- The Kremlin and its Insurance Against Dissent: 
        
       Of course, it cannot be said that the Kremlin’s constant harping on nationalism has 
swayed everyone in Russia. There are those, of course, individuals, parties, and 
organizations, that oppose Putin and his government's rhetoric. But Putin has not been 
tolerant toward opposition. In Russia, the kidnapping and killing of journalists has 
become a favored pastime for the Kremlin. The death of Anna Politkovskaya is just one 
example of this happening. Murdered in 2006, Politkovskaya was one of many that had 
offended the Kremlin with her work. According to Amy Knight, those silenced 
permanently for their infractions and attempts to revolt against Kremlin political agenda 
included Igor Domnikov, who, “...was brutally beaten by a hired thug and later died...and 
Yury Shchekochikhin, who died in July 2003 of a sudden, mysterious illness, apparently 
the result of poisoning.”79 This violence towards outspoken opponents has reached not 
only journalists, but outspoken politicians as well. The deaths of Boris Nemstov and 
Boris Berezovsky highlight just how far Putin’s reach can extend. Nemstov had been, in 
his earliest years, a member of post-Soviet Russia’s “young reformers”, and although he 
had supported President Putin’s initial succession of Yeltsin, he fell out of favor with 
Putin 2011 by leading massive street rallies against parliamentary election results as well 
as writing reports on corruption involved in the case.80 In 2015, it would seem someone 
had had enough of Nemstov and his meddling, and several hours after he had urged the 
Russian people to march against Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine crisis, he was shot 
4 times in the back. Putin took personal control over the investigation, and to this day a 
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killer has not been identified.81 Boris Berezovsky, on the other hand, had been a Putin 
stalwart for many years and was credited with helping Putin rise to the heights he has 
achieved today, especially in the very early stages of his rise to power. In the late 1990’s, 
Berezovsky ran a smear campaign against Putin’s political opponents, which helped him 
win the presidency after Yeltsin stepped down.82 He was also credited with helping 
propagate a campaign that smeared Boris Nemtsov’s image.83 After Berezovsky had a 
falling out with Putin, he went into exile in the United Kingdom, from where he decided 
to “vow to bring down” President Putin, after which he proceeded to accuse the Kremlin 
with involvement in the death of Alexander Litvinenko, a former intelligence officer and 
whistleblower that had been poisoned to death in 2009.84 In wouldn’t take long thereafter 
for Berezovsky’s body to turn up in his own bathroom, with a noose around his neck that 
made his death look like a suicide, but when the coroner performed an autopsy the cause 
of death remained a mystery.85 Berezovsky’s case is a curious one especially with regards 
to the links to Nemstov, as if whoever perpetrated his murder was tying up several loose 
ends at once.  
        Killing is of course one of the more extreme measures Putin has taken to silence 
dissent. It has not always been the case that this option has been necessary. As 
aforementioned, smear campaigns to denounce political opponents have often been 
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enough to keep his opponents at bay This has been very effective especially due to the 
Kremlin's, and in extension Putin’s, control over large swaths of Russian media. After 
Putin’s re-election in 2012, as Maria Lipman highlights, “…the Kremlin relied on loyal 
media owners to shut down or reformat outlets the government did not approve of and on 
advertisers, who readily refused to conduct business with those they deemed disloyal.”86 
An example of this is the shutting down of the liberal Moscow channel “TV Rain”. In 
2014, cable television operators loyal to the Kremlin terminated contracts with the 
channel, forcing it to operate online, which caused its viewership to drop from 12 million 
to approximately 70,00 paid subscribers.87 The Kremlin’s advances to control the domain 
of media is a safeguard against anti - Kremlin rhetoric reaching the ears of the populace. 
The channels drop in viewership signifies this as even if the channel still operates, its 
messages are reaching far less of the population, making those that may subscribe to its 
views and standpoint a minority.  
       The manipulation of votes garnered during elections has also been attributed to 
Putin’s claim to power, and the subordination of his opponents. In 2011, online activists 
were said to have discovered that election officials were set to tamper with the upcoming 
parliamentary election. Large numbers of young people volunteered to join election 
monitoring teams. These volunteers discovered vast amounts of voter fraud during their 
time at the polls, including ballot stuffing, counterfeited voting registers and “merry go 
round” voting.88 It was also note that anyone who attempted to call out officials at voting 
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locations were removed from the premises.89 It was these parliamentary elections that 
Nemstov had opposed. Of course, while these accusations cannot be directly linked to the 
Kremlin, these measures would seem to be effective tools for a leader attempting to 
maintain cohesion on the domestic front. The more voices that oppose him, the less likely 
he is to succeed internationally. A battle fought on two fronts does not bode well for a 
man trying to build a legacy and restore a former empire. 
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11. Russia Reclaiming its Empire-Historical Basis for the “Buffer Zone”: 
        
       Having discussed the internal use of nationalism as a tool to pacify and control the 
Russian populace to help steer the country’s political agenda in the Kremlin’s favor, I 
will now turn to the international sphere. As has been discussed, nationalism has been 
used to garner support for the nations activities beyond its borders. An important part of 
the aforementioned goal is the re- establishment of former spheres of influence to create a 
buffer zone between Russia and the West, but also to rise again as a great power, which 
these spheres of influence would certainly help Russia achieve. Russia’s approach closely 
resembles that of a onetime empire reclaiming former territories, in this case former 
Imperial and then Soviet territories in Eastern Europe, especially in the Balkan and Baltic 
regions. Much of this modern “land grab” and geopolitics has quite a deep history, 
starting even before the emergence of the Soviet Union. It is important to understand this 
history if any of the Kremlin’s most recent moves are to make sense. 
      Imperial Russia’s history began in the year 882. It is important to go back this far in 
time to note that, at the time of the first iteration of what would become the Russian 
empire, it was the first Eastern Slavic state to come into existence.90 The state, known as 
Rus, or Kyiv Rus, is often referred to as the origin of Eastern Slavs, which indeed 
resonates with many Slavic nations now part of Eastern Europe. It is also important to 
note that, during this time, the capital of “Kievan Russia” was, as the name suggests, the 
city of Kiev, which is now the capital of Ukraine. Of course, Eastern and Western 
scholars have been unable to agree on what this means for the joint Russo-Ukrainian 
history. Scholars in the West often see “Kievan Russia” as a part of the Russian history, 
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however those of the Russophile (Russian) school have a deeper view on the matter. To 
the Russian people, Kievan Russia is not simply a former capital of a once-unified Slavic 
state. Many of them see Kyivan Rus as the root civilization of the Russian people, with 
the Ukrainian and Belarusian people's only appearing after Kyiv Rus’s fall in 1240. In 
traditional Russophile histories, the Ukrainian people only appear in the 17th century and 
are depicted as an ethnic group yearning to join the Russian empire.91 This reading of 
history provides Russian nationalists with a justification for their attempts to subjugate 
Ukraine. With Kiev seen as the capital of Russian origins, and with the Ukrainian people 
portrayed as coming into existence after Russian power left Ukrainian lands, there is a 
primacy given to the Russian ethnicity; It is portrayed as the origin of Slavic people, and 
in effect highlights Russia as the rightful heir of a landmass that ethnic Russians 
originated from. The mention of 17th century Ukrainians as a group that merely wished 
to rejoin the Russian empire also gives the impression that there was never meant to be a 
free Ukraine, and that it is only right that Russia and Ukraine remain together.  
       Of course, Russia’s history of trying to maintain control over Eastern Europe doesn’t 
simply stop with Ukraine. The Romanov empire expanded into other Eastern European 
territories, namely Poland and Latvia. The three partitions of Poland, as they are known, 
took place in 1772, 1793 and 1795.92 The Russian empire played a part in tearing what 
was then known as the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth apart, alongside Prussia and 
Austria. This, of course, was then mirrored in a very similar way in the lead up to World 
War II. Prior to the joint invasion of Poland in September of 1939, the USSR and Nazi 
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Germany signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement on the 23rd of August 1939. It was 
initially seen as a pact of non-aggression, but contained a “secret protocol” that stated- 
“In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the 
Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania 
shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR.”93 
The secret protocol laid out a plan for the division of territory if the Russians and 
Germans worked together to occupy Eastern Europe. A clause was added onto the 
agreement, pertaining to the division of Poland. It specified that, “…the question of 
whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent 
Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined 
during further political developments.”94 History shows how this was handled, with the 
USSR and Germany each occupying a piece after the 1939 invasion. The USSR, which 
had argued Polish territories belonged to it after World War One since “Poland had not 
existed prior to the war”, would have some comfort in knowing they had snatched a 
decent chunk of their former empire from the clutches of those that would oppose them. 
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12. The History of Crimea and Russia: 
        
       Crimea, as recent events show, plays a crucial role in the Kremlin’s plans of re-
emerging as a global power. This has been historically true for Russia, as Crimea has 
been pivotal for centuries. Russia first obtained control over the Crimean Peninsula in 
1783 when Catherine II conquered the territory, along with Southern Ukraine.95 An 
increase in orientalist literature and culture was sweeping through Europe at the time, and 
this was Russia’s first “Orient”.96 It also provided the Russian empire with access to the 
Black Sea, which, over the course of history has become an important part of Russia’s 
plans to strengthen itself.  
      Russia’s first conflict over the territory came in the form of the Crimean War came in 
1853 when a religious conflict with between Russia, France and Ottoman Turkey 
escalated and Russia occupied several Turkish principalities.97 Once the war ended, the 
1856 Treaty of Paris made the Black sea neutral, meaning no Russian warships could sail 
through the region.98 This of course undercut Russia’s influence over the region, creating 
uneasiness over the Crimean Peninsula for the Russian empire. Having controlled this 
territory in the past, the lack of ability to patrol the Black sea with their ships was 
debilitating. Over the decades to follow, several more conflicts over that region erupted, 
the most prominent being the uprising of nationalist Crimean Tatars during the October 
Revolution. The conflict saw involvement from the Bolsheviks, the White Russians, and 
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the Germans, who occupied the peninsula at the time. At this conflicts conclusion, 
Vladimir Lenin and the victorious Bolsheviks went about making the Crimean 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which of course became part of the Soviet 
Union.99 During World War Two, the control of Crimea would once again fall under the 
jurisdiction of what was now Nazi Germany. The conclusion of this war created the roots 
for modern day conflict between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea. After the reconquest 
of the peninsula from Nazi Germany in 1944, Stalin set about punishing the native Tatar 
population of Crimea by deporting them from their ancestral home. According to KGB 
records, “37,750 families, or 151,424 spetposelentsev (special settlers), were registered in 
Uzbekistan by July 1, 1944. This number apparently did not include those Tatars who at 
that time were serving in the Red Army. They too were banished from the Crimea, 
bringing the total number of deportees close to 200,000.”100 After this, there was little to 
no mention of the native Tatar population. In 1954, the Crimean Peninsula, now once 
again seen as a portion of Soviet territory, was gifted to the Ukrainian Republic as a 
symbolic gesture in light of celebrations surrounding the 300th anniversary of Bogdan 
Khmelnitsky’s union with Moscow.101 It would be this action that would become one of 
the main talking points in the international community during the initial stages of the 
modern-day Ukraine crisis. 
       Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, much of Imperial Russia's former territories 
have been lost. The Soviet republics are now independent states. Some, like Poland, 
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Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have drifted towards the West, leaving Russia feeling 
exposed. This has led to Russia’s attempts reclaim parcels of the territories in question. In 
most recent times, the two most prominent examples are the 2008 conflict in Georgia, 
and the ongoing Ukraine crisis, which started in 2013. These two events are clear signs 
that the Kremlin's agenda on the international scene is bearing fruit in a way that has 
allowed Russia to reclaim some of its lost territory, and begin to re-create a region that, in 
their eyes, keeps the nation safe from Western incursion.  
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13. Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia: 
        
       Like most of the modern conflicts surrounding Russia, The Russia-Georgia war of 
2008 has roots that go back to key events in the past couple centuries. Its roots can be 
traced to the fall of the Soviet Union. In the late 1980’s, Zviad Gamsakhurdia took power 
in Georgia during a period known as “Soviet liberalization”, in part sparked by a rise of 
nationalism amongst the former Soviet States, with the battle cry for Georgia a familiar 
resounding “Georgia for the Georgians”102, which is very closely related to the cry of 
“Russia for the Russians” that the world is hearing from Russia today. Over the course of 
Gamsakhurdia’s rule, Georgia saw this nationalism harnessed, and the alienation of 
ethnic minorities began to take place. Minority groups such as Adjars, Armenians, 
Azeris, Greeks, Russians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians all feared for their cultural rights 
and right to self-rule, which had been offered in the clauses of Mikhail Gorbachev's 
Perestroika.103 Because of their continued reliance on the Kremlin and Kremlin law, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia were labeled “traitorous pawns of the Kremlin” in Georgia.  
Protests grew and eventually reached the doorsteps of both the capitals of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, Sukhumi and Tbilisi, where they devolved into violence.104 Because of 
outbreaks, violence, and clear animosity between the groups, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
both sought ways to distance themselves from Georgia, with South Ossetia even holding 
a referendum to secede from Georgia, which was set to become independent from Russia 
in 1990-1991.105 This, of course, was stifled by Georgia. On December 11th, 1990, the 
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Georgian parliament cancelled South Ossetia’s status as an independent state, and in 
1991, Zviad Gamsakhurdia became Georgia’s first elected President.106 Both actions 
were threatening to both the historically oppressed Abkhazians and South Ossetians. In 
South Ossetia, war broke out, which only furthered tensions as Georgian troops came in 
to quell the violence and reinstate control over the region.  In the case of Abkhazia, the 
1978 Abkhazian constitution was abolished in 1992 by Eduard Shevardnadze, the former 
President of Georgia, after Zviad Gamsakhurdia was ousted from power through military 
coup between 1991 and 1992.107 This abolishment and the reinstatement of a pre-Soviet 
Abkhazian constitution ensured that the lines of Abkhazian sovereignty were blurred to 
the point that Georgia could maintain control over the region with relative ease.  Having 
seen their efforts come to no avail, the regions remained under Georgian control until 
2008, when Russia stepped in to help these regions disassociate with Georgia as they had 
wanted to almost two decades earlier.  
       The Russo-Georgian conflict of 2008 was a short one. The peak of the conflict only 
lasted a couple of weeks, and at the end of August 2008, the Kremlin could count two 
more provinces towards a region that would not assimilate with the West. The moves 
Russia made in the lead up to the final confrontation, in hindsight, however, were 
remarkably clever. Firstly, it is important to note that in the years between 1992 and 
2004, South Ossetia saw peace under Georgian rule. It was over this grace period that 
Russia formed what Roy Allison calls a “symbiotic relationship” with the region. Allison 
highlights that during this period, the Kremlin very openly gave out Russian passports to 
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South Ossetian nationals, effectively making them citizens of Russia as well.108 On top of 
this, Eduard Kokoity, a Russian citizen and a resident of Moscow, was elected President 
of South Ossetia in 2001.109 Between the years of 2005 and 2006, it is noted that a 
decline in Russian and Georgian relations occurred. This decline occurred during a time 
where Georgia was on the cusp of joining NATO.110 Although a formal alliance was not 
on the table, the Bucharest summit of NATO seemed to make such an alliance possible in 
the future. Point 25 of the Summit Declaration states, “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and 
Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that 
these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable 
contributions to Alliance operations.”111 Russia, of course, could not allow the entirety of 
a nation so close to their borders become part of a Western-centric, more directly a US 
centric military alliance, and so it had to think of a solution. The Kremlin was well 
known for its actions towards improving relations with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
and in April 2008 this was further evidenced by a Presidential decree that solidified 
official Russian relations with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.112 With increasing 
interest in the region came increasing conflict. July and August of 2008 saw violence 
erupt across South Ossetia, with Ossetian separatist militias attacking Georgian 
settlements. In tandem with this offensive, volunteer troops began to arrive the Russian 
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border to help the South Ossetian forces fight the Georgian military.113 It was in August 
of 2008 that the conflict spilled over into outright war, and within 3 days, Georgian 
troops pulled out of South Ossetia.114 This left both the separatists forces of South Ossetia 
and the volunteer Russian fighters with a victory they could savor.  
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14. South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Process of Soft Annexation and Hybrid 
Warfare: 
        
       A question that looms over the conflict in South Ossetia: What role did nationalism 
play, and how was this nationalism harnessed? The answers to these questions are 
complicated, however looking over the events that took place throughout this conflicts 
history, they become ever clearer upon closer examination. In fact, much more of the 
fault may lie with Georgian nationalism. The conflicts began in the 1980’s with the 
alienation of the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia through Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s 
actions which paved the way for a fractured political and social climate that facilitated 
growing discontent between the groups, allowing for Russia to step in. But this “stepping 
in” for Russia was not merely brought about by carefully stoked Georgian nationalism, 
Russia too played an immense role in setting up events as they occurred, through the 
processes known as hybrid warfare and soft annexation.  Hybrid warfare, as it is defined 
in its most rudimentary state, “...[is] the blending of conventional and irregular 
approaches across the full spectrum of conflict.”115 Throughout the 2008 conflict, Russia 
made use of hybrid warfare by using regular armed forces, South Ossetian and Abkhazian 
militias and… “Russian special operations forces (SOF) operating covertly as “local 
defense” troops.”116  This definition, however, only scratches the surface, as it only 
illuminates the visible symptoms of Russia’s plans. With this we come to the concept of 
soft annexation, which is sometimes used interchangeably with hybrid warfare. Soft 
annexation however, has a much more nuanced definition that fits Russia’s actions in the 
Georgian conflict of 2008 more plainly. Thomas de Waal defines it as “the idea, 
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expressed in various forms over the years...that Russia is pulling political, economic, and 
military levers- all of which fall short of tradition invasion- to exploit ethnic conflicts in 
countries that used to be in its orbit…the goal is to leverage these tensions...to gain 
influence in former Soviet states, while preventing these countries from moving closer to 
the West.”117  Soft annexation, in the case of the Georgian conflict of 2008, can still be 
seen as an ongoing process, as the formal annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have 
not been announced. The process started with the realization that the people of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia had been oppressed by the Georgian government and treated as 
traitors and criminals. With this realization came the need to make Russia’s claim of 
intervention legitimate. This came through the creation of a fifth column of Russians, 
which would give Russia the reason they needed to intercede. The “fifth column”, as 
Shuster and McDonald- Gibson describe, “...combines propaganda, diplomacy, and 
eventually, special forces troops entering foreign territories in the guise of local rebel 
forces. Above all, hybrid warfare requires sympathizers inside the country.”118 The 
sympathizers Russia needed were already among the South Ossetian and Abkhazian 
populace, but the legitimacy came in part from the aforementioned handing out of 
passports to Abkhaz and South Ossetian citizens. By making them citizens of Russia, the 
Kremlin was inclined to act in their defense. Making them Russian citizens also quelled 
the domestic populace and got them behind this movement by fostering domestic 
nationalism, using statement such as the following, “Russia will continue to defend the 
rights of Russians, of our compatriots abroad, using everything we have in our 
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arsenal.”119 In fostering the need to protect Russian’s abroad, the domestic populace did 
not argue against the Kremlin’s decisions. It is a horrifically, yet masterfully, executed 
plan that can help Russia recreate its sphere of influence and return to its power of old. 
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15. Ukraine and the Orange Revolution- A Precursor to the Modern Crisis: 
        
       As we have seen, Ukraine too has become an example of what Russian hybrid 
warfare and soft annexation can achieve. Like with the 2008 Georgian conflict, Ukraine’s 
political turmoil in 2013 provided Russia with an opportunity to add to its buffer zone. 
Specifically, Russia was determined to forestall what it saw as Ukraine’s growing ties 
with the West. As the Kremlin saw it, the shift threatened Russia geopolitically- as well 
as ideologically. To put this in broader perspective, one must look back to Ukraine 
between 2004 and 2005, an era known as the Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution 
was the result of a presidential election between Viktor Yushchenko and then Prime 
Minister Viktor Yanukovych. The “revolution” itself was the phenomenon of hundreds of 
thousands of people in Kiev, and then millions across Ukraine, marching in protests in 
rebuke of President Yanukovych's supposed victory.120 The election itself had seemed to 
be fraudulent. On November 21st, the election seemed to be going in Yushchenko's 
favor, with 52% of votes going towards him, in comparison to Yanukovych's 43%.121 
When the election came to a close, however, the results had shifted in Yanukovych's 
favor. According to the Central Election Commission, 4 hours after Yushchenko's 
projected lead, the Eastern Donetsk region, known to be a predominantly Russian region 
of Ukraine and Yanukovych's home region, saw a sharp rise in voter turnout, rising from 
78% to 96.2%, and the same was seen in Luhansk, a neighboring region of the country 
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where voter turnout rose from 80% to 89% by the time the polls were closed.122 The 
polls, by the next morning, showed that Yanukovych had won. 
       Across Ukraine, the cry of electoral fraud spread like wildfire. It was clear to many 
that this election had been tilted in Yanukovych's favor. Claims of fraud came from all 
corners of Ukraine from groups such as the Nonpartisan Committee of Voters of Ukraine, 
which claimed that, after having sent out monitors to various polling sites, the number of 
rigged ballots came close to 2.8 million.123 Similarly, The Ukrainian Security Service 
presented evidence that proved the guilt of various members of Yanukovych's campaign 
staff tampering with CEC computers to manipulate the vote in Yanukovych's favor.124 
Corruption within the bounds of this election hadn’t stopped simply at this, however. 
There were numerous television campaigns run against Yushchenko, discrediting him as 
a candidate. The gravest form of corruption came in the form of Yushchenko’s poisoning. 
Yushchenko was forced to stop his campaign a month short of the election due to a 
mysterious “illness”, “His mysterious sickness forced him from the campaign trail for 
nearly a month, leaving his body weakened and his face badly scarred. Later tests 
revealed that he was suffering from dioxin poisoning.”125 
        Over the course of the next several months, Yushchenko, with his supporters rallied 
the country to overturn what was a terrible travesty for the Ukrainian people. Yushchenko 
and his supporters decided to go ahead with what Adrian Karatnycky sees as a two-
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pronged strategy, both revolutionary and constitutional.126 After Ukraine's election, the 
country found itself with three presidents, Yushchenko who was “sworn in” on 
November 22nd, Leonid Kuchma, who was leaving office, and  Viktor Yanukovych, who 
had seemingly won the vote.127 After facing much adversity, a national ban from 
appearing on television, and overall opposition from the government that had been 
fraudulently elected, Yushchenko’s two pronged strategy, which meant pushing for 
change in legislature and in government with the aid of other leaders in Eastern Europe, 
mainly Poland's President Aleksander Kwasniewski, Lithuania's President Valdas 
Adamkus, and the European Union's Foreign Affairs Commissioner Javier Solana, as 
well as harnessing the grassroots level support provided by the people, began to pay 
off.128 Another election was held in the wake of the Orange Revolution, and Yushchenko 
was elected president by the margin he had originally held in the first. This sent a 
shockwave across Eastern Europe, one that Russia, could not ignore. 
       The Orange Revolution has had its success in deposing Yanukovych of his 
fraudulent victory linked to its own brand of Ukrainian nationalism. As with other post-
communist revolutions, The Orange Revolution is a product of what scholars such as 
Taras Kuzio call “civic nationalism”. Civic nationalism is the combination of nationalism 
and civic engagement, as seen in Ukraine, in the face of injustices on the governmental 
level. As Kuzio describes it, this form of nationalism “...can generate the mobilization 
capacity for strong civil societies and democracies” and has been a “battery generating 
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popular power for rapid mobilization.”129 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and Orthodox 
Churches were some of the driving factors behind the civic engagement that occurred 
during the Orange Revolution. Unlike other forms of Orthodoxy, Ukrainian Orthodoxy 
differs in a variety of ways, the main difference being that instead of being coopted by 
the communists in the 1920’s, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was 
suppressed by the Soviets.130 This automatically left the church and its members alienated 
by the communist regime, and decades down the line this paid off for Viktor Yushchenko 
as Russia and those influenced by Russia were seen as the “other” or foreign.131 Given 
this history, members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are inherently more Western, 
and during the Orange Revolution saw Yushchenko as the candidate that would bring 
Ukraine closer to the West and away from Russia's control. Similarly, The Greek 
Catholic Church suffered from having their parishes taken over by Russian Orthodox 
Church, and was formally abolished in 1946.132 During the elections that would 
eventually see Yushchenko achieve victory, an average of 50.35% of Orthodox believers 
voted for him, while a significantly lower portion, 37.83% voted for Yanukovych. In 
tandem with this, 51% of Ukrainian Orthodox believers were considered to be 
“revolutionary enthusiast” supporters of the orange revolution.133 Given such numbers, 
the followers of both the Ukrainian Orthodox and Greek- Catholic churches provided a 
solid base of support for Yushchenko and his rise to power. It is also important to note 
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that the churches of Ukraine also played an immense role in making sure the Orange 
Revolution was a nonviolent as it was. According to Svetlana Filiatreau, various parishes 
and communities throughout Ukraine saw peaceful protests mainly due to the 
engagement of religious entities. For example, the congregation of the Embassy of the 
Blessed Kingdom of God for All Nations Church mobilized 25,000 members to engage in 
peaceful protest and resistance towards the fraudulent election results.134 By bringing 
together a united front of faithful followers using their religious ties as a foundation for 
their unity in the face of such a pivotal moment in political history, the church’s active 
and nonviolent engagement only underlines the role churches played as a facilitator of 
civic engagement and civic nationalism. It was an act of liberation facilitated by an 
ideological institution in the face of adversity from a foe that historically had only offered 
them oppression.  
       It is interesting to see the converse roles religion has played in the facilitation of 
nationalism in both Ukraine and Russia. Ukrainians, used religion as a means to 
liberation from Russia’s influence, where for the latter it is a cornerstone under which the 
people share their unity under the Kremlin’s watchful gaze. The mistake made by the 
USSR in suppressing the major churches of Ukraine may have deprived Russia of a 
means of political influence, especially during the Ukraine crisis as we know it today. In 
the end, much of Yanukovych’s failure in becoming president was attributed to Western 
involvement. Ever the culprit, the West was seen by Russia as having swayed the election 
through their support of Yushchenko. Theories surrounding Western support include 
notions that the West helped him win the election through direct funding from the United 
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States, which allegedly reached a figure of 65 million US dollars.135 Others theorized that 
because the general consensus among world leaders was that the election in Ukraine 
should be free of intervention by outsider actors, the money was covertly smuggled into 
Ukraine via institutions such as Freedom House and the Carnegie Foundation.136 If such 
accusations were to be true, Russia’s necessity towards intervention, while not 
acceptable, becomes understandable. If the West can influence elections that take apart 
regimes that would benefit the Kremlin, it is in Russia’s best interest to do everything it 
can to stop such occurrences from taking place. 
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16. The Ukraine Crisis- Soft Annexation and Hybrid Warfare Fueled by 
Nationalism: 
        
       The results of the Orange Revolution left a sour taste in the mouths of Vladimir Putin 
and other top Russian leaders. It was no secret that the Kremlin had backed Yanukovych 
to win the election. During his campaign, Putin had promoted Yanukovych in interviews, 
as well as allegedly pumped millions of dollars into his election.137 Yanukovych's defeat 
was something that would indeed influence Putin’s action in Georgia, and even more so 
during the 2013-14 Ukraine crisis. A Yushchenko victory was not something Putin and 
the Kremlin could tolerate. It saw Ukraine move Westward, away from Russia’s sphere 
of influence. This, undoubtedly left Russia feeling very bare with regards to its 
geopolitical defenses against the West. For the Kremlin, there was hope however. In 
2010, Viktor Yanukovych was elected president. Observers from the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) said that the election was fair, and called 
Yanukovych’s win an "impressive display" of democracy.138 It wasn’t long before 
Yanukovych revealed his plans for a political shift back towards Russia and the Kremlin. 
Yanukovych promised stronger ties with Russia, indicating a sharp change from the 
policies Yushchenko had undertaken. For example, Yanukovych indicated that he would 
renew Russia’s lease on stationing their fleet on the Black Sea in Sevastopol, which 
Yushchenko had promised to not renew after the current lease ran out in 2017.139 In many 
ways, people saw Yanukovych’s election as the result of the failure of the Orange 
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Revolution to rid Ukraine of corrupt politics; but I would contest this interpretation. 
Yanukovych’s election was less a failure of the Orange Revolution and more a failure of 
Yushchenko to bring about the change much of the populace wanted. While the Orange 
Revolution played its role as a “revolution” uprooting a fraudulent leader and allowing 
the one the Ukrainian people chose take office, levels of trust between politicians, the 
government, and the people had not been adequately mended. For example, trust for the 
police had not risen from the 14% it had been in 2004, trust for political parties was only 
at 10%, and they still viewed as the institutions with the least public respect in the 
country.140 Yushchenko's approval rating plummeted throughout his term as President, 
which shows that there was minimal confidence in his leadership. His popularity fell 
from 45% in 2005 to about 23% in 2008.141 While civic and political rights had improved 
under Yushchenko, Ukraine still suffered from deteriorating “economic and social 
circumstances”, which clearly meant that jobs and opportunities were not coming as 
quickly as many had hoped.142 This draws many parallels to the years Russia endured 
under Boris Yeltsin- while the country moved forward civically and politically, the 
economy left much to be desired, and many spent this time in less than favorable 
economic conditions. It would seem, then, that the limited improvements Yushchenko 
made during his tenure were the reason Putin's ally was now in power. What would 
follow in the next four years however, would demonstrate Russia’s capabilities as a 
nation to harness nationalism as the most effective of fuels to perpetrate their breed of 
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hybrid warfare and soft annexation in a way that made their actions in  South Ossetia and 
Georgia pale in comparison.  
       Beginning in 2008, Ukraine became the center of a tug of war between Russia and 
the West, especially the European Union. As Dmitri Trenin highlights, Russia showed 
President Viktor Yanukovych and all of Ukraine, “...in the form of trade barriers, what it 
would be like choosing the EU over Russia and, later, in the form of an aid package, what 
it would gain if it made the ‘right’ choice.”143 In November of 2013, the situation began 
to heat up. Though Yanukovych seemed on the brink of signing an association agreement 
with the European Union, he abruptly suspended the deal. Many Ukrainians saw their 
hopes of economic integration with the West slip away. This was not the first time 
Yanukovych had done something of the sort. In 2010, when he first came into office, one 
of his first moves was to block a similar agreement that would have seen Ukraine join 
NATO.144 As Trenin writes, “The November 2013 decision led to mass protests in central 
Kiev, which almost immediately turned into a permanent standoff on the capitals 
Independence Square.”145 These protests were the beginning of what would become 
called the Euromaidan movement. Among the many facets of the Ukraine crisis, the 
Euromaidan movement has played an intrinsic role in how the situation has developed. In 
the eyes of many who have watched its rise, it seemed unlikely that the movement even 
came to life. Five months prior to November of 2013, all of Ukraine opposition parties, 
including the All-Ukrainian Union ‘Fatherland (Batkivshchyna), the All-Ukrainian Union 
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Freedom (Svoboda) and Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) banded 
together to try and organize protests against Yanukovych under the banner of “Rise up, 
Ukraine”, however the protests failed to meet expectations as of the 100,00 protesters 
expected to show their support, only between 20,000 and 30,000 actually took part.146 
Yanukovych's decision to mothball the Association Agreement with the EU tipped the 
scales, however. For many, especially in Western Ukraine, the signing of the agreement 
would have been a sign for change, bringing Ukraine away from Russia’s influence. One 
only must look back to the Orange Revolution to find reason for The Ukrainian people’s 
willingness to stray from Russia’s side, as they funded a candidate that, while was now in 
office, was not the most popular. This then makes it seem as if the Euromaidan 
movement was not as unlikely as most made it out to be. According to the index of 
confidence concerning governments, Ukraine ranked last among European countries, 
with the confidence in the Parliament standing at 1.99 on a scale of a possible 10.147 In 
terms of general dissatisfaction with the government on the same scale, the figure sat at 
2.25, with the confidence in the judicial system at 2.26, and the confidence in police sat at 
2.50, each of which were the lowest scores across Europe.148 Given these numbers, and 
Yanukovych’s last-minute turn away from the European Union, the Euromaidan 
movement begins to seem much more understandable. In the context and framing of the 
current government, they did not see a way they could change the direction Ukraine was 
heading in, hence the protests began. In tandem with this, the driving population behind 
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the Euromaidan movement, mainly youth, had little reason to back their future in the 
hands of Yanukovych. Under his tenure as president, youth unemployment rates, and 
unemployment rates in general had skyrocketed. According to reports, as of 2013, the 
number of registered unemployed persons stood at 435.4 thousand people, and of this 
number,183.3 thousand or 42.1% were young people between the ages of 14 and 35. 
Among those between the ages of 24 and 29, unemployment had increased, to 9.5% from 
9.2% in 2011.149 The Euromaidan wanted to see Ukraine move toward the West. Yuriy 
Shveda and Joung Ho Park describe these aspirations as follows: “This attempt is in the 
same vein as the revolutionary sentiment of 1968 in Western Europe, which was also 
against conservative society and its legacy of political and unethical values. It was a 
struggle of generations, parents, and children. In this context, the ideal of the Ukrainian 
Youth and the impetus for the revolution lie in the hope of changing Ukrainian society 
and pursuing salutary European values.”150 In hindsight then, one can say that 
Yanukovych’s turn away from the European Union meant more than just remaining close 
to Russia. It meant holding onto values that were conservative. But the next generation of 
Ukrainians did not share these values and as they saw it Yanukovych’s backtracking on 
the Association Agreement meant that their hopes for an economically prosperous future 
had been dashed. Integration with the European Union promised more economic 
opportunities and new market opportunities for Ukraine. In their eyes, Yanukovych and 
his government had destroyed the future they yearned for. The protests showed that there 
was a large portion of the population that rejected their government’s close ties with 
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Russia. To them, that's what an agreement with the European Union was; It was a way to 
have their own identity as a nation, as every nation is entitled to. 
      The Euromaidan, as it came to be seemed unlikely to succeed. It lacked much of what 
the Orange Revolution had: strong political or civic organizational backing and had an 
absence of popularly recognized leaders at its helm.151 But as some scholars note the 
Euromaidan’s rise was helped tremendously by the availability of social media. Social 
media, according to Tetyana Bohdanova, played an immense role in both covering the 
media hype around the new agreement Yanukovych was meant to sign with the European 
Union, and then was the facilitator and medium that helped spread outrage across the 
populace once it was clear the agreement would fall though.152 In tandem with this, social 
media allowed for the movement to be live streamed and broadcast to a wider audience, 
which garnered support from abroad in its initial stages.153 This created a wider advocacy 
network for the Euromaidan, which allowed outrage and external pressures to be applied 
on Yanukovych as well. In this way, it can be said that the Euromaidan movement 
applied external pressures on Yanukovych in the way that Russia had, but getting the 
attention of people across the globe, and in turn governments within the European Union. 
         Finally, the Euromaidan was energized by its own form of nationalism. The 
Euromaidan movement quickly made its slogan “Glory to Ukraine-Glory to Heroes!”, 
which roused what scholars call the legacy of “20th century Ukrainian Nationalism”, 
which indicates that, “national and social liberation in Ukraine can be established only by 
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creating “a Ukrainian Independent Unified State.”154 This was important during the rise 
of this 20th century nationalism as half of Ukraine, known as “Great Ukraine” was 
controlled by Russia, and “Western Ukraine” had fallen under the influence of various 
state actors, including Austria-Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Hungary.155 It only seems 
fitting that this would be the approach Euromaidan would take, especially with what was 
in store for Ukraine in the coming years. Even in the beginning however, such a rallying 
cry was pertinent. Ukraine could never be complete and unified, or independent for that 
matter, if they were as closely tied to Russia as they were. Such supervision for frankly 
Russian benefit would not allow the country to develop or grow, nor did it sit well with 
the direction that the younger generation wished their country to go in. By revitalizing 
this breed of nationalism and using it to invigorate those who would stand with them, the 
Euromaidan gained strength and caught the attention of both the Ukrainian government 
and Europe.  
       Though the Ukrainian people ready to fight Yanukovych, the Euromaidan movement 
started peacefully. As Trenin writes, “The essentially civic protest, which became known 
as the Maidan, was joined by nationalist groups, hailing from Western Ukraine”. In the 
eyes of the people, Yanukovych was “just an Easterner” supporting Russian views and 
ideals156. Protests continued well until February, where they escalated into violence.  
President Yanukovych had decided to use force to get rid of the demonstrators. He 
dispatched police forces to fight the protesters, who had formed, “a capable force built 
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around a nationalist organization called the Right Sector.”157 As violence broke and Kiev 
burned, Yanukovych abruptly changed tactics and decided to open talks with the West 
and the political opposition. He held meetings with the Foreign ministers of France, 
Poland and Germany, during which he co-signed an agreement between the Ukrainian 
government and leaders of the opposition.158 Although the treaty was signed, 
Yanukovych was forced to flee to Russia soon after signing to treaty as hostilities 
between radicals and his government were still strong.  
       From Russia’s perspective, Ukraine could not be allowed to become a partner of the 
West, not least because it shared a long border with Russia and was essential to Russia’s 
identity in the eyes of Russian nationalists. The Kremlin argued that the results of the 
2010 election, having been fair, made Yanukovych’s ousting unconstitutional. President 
Putin was quoted saying the following: “My assessment is that it is a unconstitutional 
overthrow and armed seizure of power...Are the current authorities legitimate? Part of 
parliament yes, but the rest no. There is only one legitimate president — from a legal 
point of view, it's Mr. Yanukovych...”159 Putin’s argument stated that as President of 
Ukraine, Yanukovych had every right to put aside any agreement with the European 
Union. It was on this basis, in tandem with Yanukovych’s plea to Russia’s leader to 
“defend the lives and health of Ukrainians” that Russia decided to step in.160 Shortly after 
Yanukovych fled the country, Russia sent in its special forces to secure Crimea. Crimea 
itself being over 50 percent ethnic Russian in population, gave little to no resistance, and 
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even rejoiced the annexation. Since then, Crimea has served as a port for the Russian 
Black sea fleet, the only warm water port in Russia's control. This port, in many ways, is 
one of the many motivations behind Russia’s invasion of Crimea. A warm water port is 
an asset that can help Russia expand its influence on an international level, as well as its 
influence over its neighbors. 
      Russia’s annexation of Crimea was, of course, far more complicated than simply 
sending in special forces to secure the area. The first action that Putin and the Kremlin 
took issue with, as aforementioned, was the ousting of Yanukovych from power. Putin 
very clearly saw this removal of Yanukovych from power as an “unconstitutional coup”, 
and justified his infringement on Ukrainian sovereignty by stating Russia's annexation of 
Crimea was at the behest of the people in Crimea and Sevastopol.161 Indeed, this was 
reflected in the referendum that was held on March 16th, 2014 in Crimea, which saw the 
majority Russian population vote to join with Russia. It only took two days for a treaty to 
be signed that led to both Crimea and Sevastopol to become part of Russia.162 Russia’s 
actions also had an impact on the Donetsk region of Ukraine, which has become the focal 
point of a particularly violent separatist movement, led by what is known as the Donetsk 
People’s Republic (DNR). Eastern and Southern Ukraine suddenly found itself in the 
midst of a Ukrainian power vacuum after Yanukovych was ousted from office, and this 
led to the coming together of varying Russian nationalist and pan-Slavic groups to form 
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the movement.163 The formation of such a movement would become crucial to the steps 
Russia would take with regards to the conflict still prominent in the region today.  
      As in the Georgian conflict of 2008, the Ukraine crisis shows the effects of both 
hybrid warfare and soft annexation. Firstly, the identification of strife in Ukraine was key 
for Russia’s tactics to work. The people of Ukraine were at odds with a leader, 
Yanukovych, which was inherently pro-Russian. While this was a problem for Russia, it 
increasingly turned into an opportunity for gain. With social and political tensions high, 
the power vacuum allowed Russia to take advantage of strife between western Ukraine 
and the combined eastern and southern Ukraine. The east and south had strong 
populations of ethnic Russians and Russian foreign nationals that were ready to act as a 
fifth column, or on the ground supporters and sympathizers. The overwhelming majority 
or ethnic Russians in Crimea helped legitimize both the referendum that took place, and 
Russia’s invasion of the region, which was explained as a protection of the Russian 
population there. Nationalist incentives then drove Russian support of the Donetsk 
separatists, even if they didn’t outwardly admit this. In a documentary entitled “Cold War 
2.0”, Vice’s Shane Smith entered the front lines of the conflict between the separatist 
held Donetsk region and the rest of Ukraine. During the documentary, Smith interviewed 
several soldiers on the Donetsk side of the struggle. Of course, many are reluctant to 
speak with Western media, however one did indicate that he indeed came from Russia on 
his own behest, as did many others, to incidentally fight for the rights of the people in 
Donetsk and support their disdain for the Ukrainian government.164 Interestingly enough, 
one of the soldiers interviewed stated that, “This is not about picking a fight with 
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Ukraine, it's about a greater Slav world.”165 Admissions by these fighters recall the 
Georgian crisis, during which “volunteer fighters” came and fought to defend what might 
be called their “Slavic brothers”, mainly the Russian nationals that held Russian 
citizenship. This is by no means a small indication that, if indeed these were volunteers 
from Russia with no military training, the words of Putin’s domestic nationalist rhetoric 
had hit their mark. The people were mobilizing to defend their country without the 
government's intervention, meaning they themselves believed in the movement the 
Kremlin had started. It is here where the hybrid warfare aspect of Russia’s plan comes 
into play. In pulling social and political levers within Ukraine, the mobilization of a, 
“...Russian-speaking counter-revolution against the Euromaidan throughout eastern and 
southern Ukraine” provided a smokescreen for Russian special forces to enter Ukraine 
and fuel the revolution at hand, with many of these forces aiding the separatists in taking 
control of official buildings and governmental structures.166 This Russian speaking 
revolution has taken the fight to the Ukrainian government, leaving both the Luhansk and 
Donetsk regions of the country in a war-torn state. Several ceasefires have been put in 
place, but these have often been broken, leading to more death and destruction. The 
effects of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine become very clear: A region that was once not 
only a Soviet State, but for several centuries was part of the older Russian empire, which 
had been on the cusp of joining the European Union and NATO, now had large swaths of 
its territory swallowed up by the former hegemon of the region, and the rest of the 
country was now in a state of disarray and distress. Russia, using nationalist rhetoric 
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infused with soft annexation and hybrid warfare, had destabilized the region and added to 
a buffer zone of territory, foiling the political advance of the West in the process. 
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17. Security Fears and Human Rights Violations: 
        
       Besides affecting Ukraine and Georgia, Russia’s efforts to create a buffer zone 
against the West through nationalism-fueled soft annexation and hybrid warfare has sent 
shockwaves around the region. Russia’s actions in Crimea have created a vast array of 
human rights issues for the Crimean natives, the Crimean Tatars. As of Putin’s 
annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars have been forced to flee their homes. As of May 
2014, upwards of 7,000 Crimean Tatars have fled Crimea due to the discrimination they 
would face if they stayed. According to John Dalhuisen, of Amnesty International, 
“...Those who have stayed face the unenviable choice of having to give up their 
Ukrainian citizenship and accept a Russian one or become ‘foreigners’ in their own 
homeland.”167 Tatars are being given the choice between giving up their identity as 
citizens of Ukraine and becoming citizens of Russia, or being outcasts in the land they 
have inhabited for generations, which has forced many to leave their homes behind. The 
abuses don’t stop there, however. According to Amnesty International, “Tatar activists 
have been detained and ill-treated by groups of armed men, and in one case (as of March 
2014), killed.”168 Here, it is easy to see the freedom of speech and expression that the 
Tatars had prior to Russia’s annexation is being threatened to a great degree. On top of 
this, “Mosques, schools (madrasas), community centers, firms and private homes 
belonging to Tatars have been searched and raided by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs...The Crimean Tatars only independent television station, ATR, has come under 
heavy pressure and many activists, journalists and bloggers have been forced to leave 
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Crimea.”169 Not only are their public meeting spaces threatened, Tatar media outlets have 
become targets of persecution by their Crimean authorities. In March of 2015, the 
pressure on Crimean Tatar media outlets turned into a shutdown. According to Amnesty 
International researcher Krasimir Yankov, “In the past, Crimean Tatar broadcasters have 
been accused of spreading inter-ethnic hatred and extremism, which are very serious 
charges under Russian law...Now there will be a total control of information by 
Russia.”170 The basic premise behind the pressure and shutdown is to stop Crimean Tatar 
media outlets from spewing what Russian leaders would call, “extremist propaganda” to 
the public. They saw these outlets as a danger to their grasp on Crimea, and had to stamp 
them out, in the process infringing on the rights of the Tatars.  
      On top of infringing on the human rights of the major minority group in Crimea, 
Russia’s actions have unfortunately put many of the countries in both the Balkans and 
Baltics on red alert. In Lithuania, for example, the annexation of Crimea and ongoing 
conflict in eastern Ukraine has led to a massive rise in expenditures with regards to the 
military budget. On top of this, as of April 2015, the Lithuanian government introduced 
compulsory military service, in response to the growing fear that Russia is indeed 
becoming a geopolitical threat once again.171 More and more, Lithuanians seem to regard 
Russia as the biggest threat to their country. For example, a 2002 survey showed that the 
Lithuanian population was mainly concerned with internal threats to security. The survey 
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indicated that only 1% of population referred to external threats in their answers.172 By 
contrast, in a 2016 survey 21% of Lithuanians indicated geopolitical military threats as 
being their major security fear.173 Poland has also been put on red alert. Somerville et al. 
summarize these concerns very concisely, “... as well as being the European state with the 
westernmost border with Russia, at the latter’s Kaliningrad exclave, Poland also borders 
Belarus, a close Russian ally...borders are heavily militarized...The Zapad-2009 and 
Ladoga-2009 military exercises in August and September 2009... saw over 30,000 
Russian and Belarusian military personnel take part in a series of exercises...this also 
included simulating suppression of a Polish minority uprising in Belarus, and the 
rehearsing of coastal landings and even a nuclear first strike on Polish territory.”174 Hence 
Poland’s wariness of Russian aggression is well founded, and sharing a border with a 
staunch Russian ally only furthers concerns. Lithuania and Poland, among other states in 
the region that feel threatened, are part of NATO. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
states that, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe 
or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they 
agree that... in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked 
by taking forthwith...such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, 
to restore and maintain...security...”175 Given this fact, NATO would be forced to act in 
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defense of either Poland or Lithuania, if either became the next target for Putin and the 
Kremlin. This could drag most of the world into a horrific European war. The President 
of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaite is quoted in stating that, “If the behavior of especially 
today’s leadership in Russia will become even more unpredictable, even more aggressive, 
of course some kind of provocation can be. The threats which we are already seeing via 
exercises on our border in the Kaliningrad region...That's why we need to be prepared to 
defend ourselves.  In 1940, we made a mistake. We didn’t fight back Russia’s invasion, 
and we stayed, because of that, in the Soviet Union for 50 years. We will not repeat this 
mistake, we will defend ourselves.”176  In response to this, The Lithuanian government 
has enforced practiced military drills along the Lithuanian border with Russia.”177 Given 
both the complications highlighted by these states NATO’s membership, as well as the 
words of the Lithuanian president, these nations seem resolved to not lay down, belly 
first, and let Russia walk over them and bring them back into their sphere of influence, 
only highlighting even more that this conflict could have devastating worldly 
consequences, and deserves the attention it has been starved of over the past few years. 
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18. Is Russia Alone to Blame? 
        
       It cannot be said, by any margin, that the West bears no blame for the animosity 
between Russia and itself. Since the Cold War, The United States and NATO have 
disregarded Russia, seeing it as a small player, a ruined nation on the international stage. 
Its empire broken, the conditions in Russia in the early 1990’s were abysmal, which of 
course allowed for nationalism to fester, and a leader like Putin to lay claim to power. In 
the 2000’s, the United States, and NATO, further became involved in what could be seen 
as aggressive moves that may have put Russia on the defensive. In 2007, it was 
announced that the United States planned to deploy “elements of missile defense in 
Poland, which amounted to 10 anti- ballistic missiles and a radar installation to track the 
launch of missiles within the Czech Republic.178 While these measures didn’t necessarily 
indicate offensive intent against Russia, the mere introduction of any NATO weaponry 
into the region was sure to escalate any sort of conflict that would erupt between the two. 
The acceptance of such measures is also an indicator that Eastern Europe felt the need to 
be under the umbrella of protection of NATO, which means, even before the events in 
Georgia, there was a semblance of threat that remained visible to nations within the 
region. It would be too far to say that this action alone was responsible for the annexation 
of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Crimea, but it surely tipped the scales in favor of such 
actions. The closer the West got to Russia, the more threatened the country became, like a 
cornered animal. Indeed, Russia lashed out, and we now have current events as they stand 
today. The West was simply not prepared to deal with the tools Russia had developed to 
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defend what it considers its sphere of influence, which makes the use of nationalist 
rhetoric to fuel this international agenda even more surprising, amazing, and terrifying.    
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19. Conclusion and Prognosis: 
       The playing field has been set for an interesting future for both Russia, Eastern 
Europe, and the world. Putin has done, on his part, as much as he can to cause havoc in 
the region and destabilize the progress of the Western front. In 2008 he helped in the 
destabilization of Georgia which had its eyes turned by the European Union and 
prospective membership. By playing a role in Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s informal 
secession the Kremlin added a geopolitical layer of protection, and set the stage for a 
potential land grab in the future. History shows that both the Abkhaz and South Ossetian 
people have felt much closer to Russia than they have ever felt to the Georgian State, and 
down the line the world cannot be certain that Russia will not incorporate the regions into 
the Russian Federation. To highlight this, the Ossetian population was set to vote in the 
Russian elections this year.179 For a state that has not been fully annexed and made part 
of the Russian Federation, taking part in what should be a “foreign” election is an 
interesting step to take. Ossetians including Lyudvig Chibirov, former president of South 
Ossetia, still view President Putin as a liberator of the Ossetian people, which only 
highlights his stature amongst Ossetians.180 In tandem with this, in July of 2017, Russia 
moved its border several hundred yards into Georgian Territory.181 All the signs are 
pointing towards a creeping “soft” annexation of the territories, with Russia inching ever 
closer in small ways with the help of the sentiment they had amassed with the Abkhaz 
and South Ossetian people. 
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       As for Ukraine, after several failed attempts at peace, the first being the Minsk Peace 
Protocol back in 2015, and more recently the failed 2017 ceasefire agreement, the 
conflict rages on, and violence is rampant in Luhansk and Donetsk, which make up the 
general Donbas region. A new ceasefire was reached on April 5th, 2018.  It is yet to be 
seen whether it will hold, or fall apart like the rest. According to Volodymyr Yelchenko, 
Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States, the death toll has reached 10,000 and 
hundreds of thousands more have been displaced.182 Yelchenko spoke at length about the 
conflict which has now lasted 4 years at Princeton University, where he highlighted that 
the low-profile nature of the conflict was just what Russia wanted, its strategy of hybrid 
warfare meant to not attract attention from the international community.183 Just days after 
this occurred, Russia attacked a total of 66 times within 24 hours, leaving 70 dead, 
according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.184 The Crimean peninsula, 
unsurprisingly remains under the control of Russia. This indeed has the feeling of a “long 
game” for Russia. With attentions turned elsewhere, prior attempts at sanctions failing 
and the region still destabilized, Russia’s worries for Western incursion can be curtailed 
for the moment, and the recent attack in the Donbas region shows they are hardly using 
this as a moment to slow down. Indeed, the next few years will be a prime window for 
them to expand their influence in the region as focus remains on more immediate issues.  
       Not coincidentally, Putin has been elected to a third term. According to reports, he 
won the election by a landslide 75% of the vote, but of course as with every election 
within the Russian Federation for the last two decades, there were cries of ballot box 
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stuffing and forced voting.185 This will of course mean 6 more years of Vladimir Putin as 
president, which puts him in the perfect position to continue his work both at home and 
abroad. That means 6 more years of expansion, an extension upon which he can build on 
his work and continue his fight to keep the West at bay. It seems unlikely that Putin will 
change anything about both his domestic or international politics, and they have worked 
wonders for him up until now. By nullifying any sort of prominent dissent through the 
promotion of Russian nationalism for the Russian people as both a fuel and a cohesive 
force to bring them together against the outside world, projected by the government as an 
“ever present oppression” of the Russian people and nation, the Kremlin and Putin have 
been able to justify their political agenda and actions on the international stage. What’s 
more, using nationalism as a fuel for both the destabilization of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as well as the annexation of Crimea and the continued conflict in Ukraine has 
led to a symbiotic state where the domestic population not only does not oppose these 
actions, but actively encourages such behavior for the good of ethnic Russians and 
Russian nationals abroad. It is this link that makes nationalism such a powerful tool for 
Russia, and what makes their strategies of hybrid warfare and soft annexation so potent 
and successful. The participation of “volunteer forces” in both situations shows how 
deeply nationalism has been woven into the populace, and how easily it can be used to 
carve out geopolitical territory to help recreate Russia’s old sphere of influence, and 
oppose the West in a region it’s dominion has stood for centuries, and will stand if its 
continued efforts go unchecked by the international community. For now, Putin is on 
course to re -establish some semblance of Russian greatness on the international scene, 
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and his legacy is being painted by the use nationalism, soft annexation and hybrid 
warfare in the blood of those unfortunate enough to stand between him and the revival of 
Russian dominance.  
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